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DEDICATION 
Iuliae. Tu es cordi mihi, mea uxor, nunc et semper. 
Et patri: cognosces veritatem et veritas te liberabit. 
Matri meae etiam, cum amore. 
I have to tell you that, since last we met, 
I have endured a wrong so great and strange, 
That neither life nor death can give me rest. 
Ask me not what it is, for there are deeds 
Which have no form, sufferings which have no tongue. 
-Percy Bysshe Shelley (The Cenci, act III, scene I: 155-159) 
111 
There is many a boy here today who looks on war as all glory, but boys, it is all hell. You 
can bear this warning voice to generations yet to come. I l.ook upon war with horror. 
-William Tecumseh Sherman (1820-1891), U.S. General. From a speech, Columbus, 
Ohio, August 11, 1880 
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ABSTRACT 
Warf are has always been vital to the state for a number of reasons. Those in 
power have a vested interest in maintaining control over not only war itself, but also 
information related to the conflict. One way they accomplish this is by making decisions 
that restrict, alter, tone-down, or otherwise change content related to human bodies in 
times of conflict that is meant for widespread dissemination through mainstream media 
and official government or military reporting. An extreme implementation of this power 
can makes bodies disappear. Drawing on the work of Gusterson (2004), Ehrenreich 
(1997), Sontag (2003), Chomsky (2002), Scott (1990), Clastres (1974), Foucault (1977), 
and several others, I argue that this "symbolic disappearance" of the body in Western 
military contexts is an example of state power exercised to help sustain a hegemonic 
authority structure. This power can result in several negative consequences for citizens, 
soldiers, and veterans of the nation-state, as well as for foreign residents and soldiers 
affected by military actions. 
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Introduction 
War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life and death; the road 
to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied. 
-Sun Tzu 
1 
In the November 2005 edition of Mcaim magazine, journalist Kathy Dobie wrote 
an article in which she discusses the difficult economic and social situations that soldiers 
returning from the War on Terror face when they arrive home. She focuses on the 
tremendous psychological stress from which many veterans suffer and the manifestations 
of such stress, which may include post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, 
substance abuse, violence, homelessness, unemployment, or suicide. She interviews 
several recent veterans, who describe the daily horrors they faced while deployed, as well 
as their dismay at returning to a country without the skills and support needed to be 
reintegrated into society and to succeed in the civilian world. In addition, she highlights 
several organizations that are trying to bring national attention to these difficulties and 
interviews some of their key members. Her bottom line is that returning veterans have, in 
the last fifty years, largely been neglected by the very country and people they served. 
Upon discharge from military service, she writes (108), many soldiers "just seem to 
disappear." 
Disappearing bodies are, in a large sense, the topic of this work. Bodies can 
vanish in a number of ways, of course, both figuratively and literally. My focus, 
however, is the symbolic loss of the body within several contexts (although primarily the 
military), which results from the censorship (voluntary and otherwise), language, and 
rhetorical strategies employed in the reporting from both military and civilian sources 
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about the human cost of war. Such tactics - when used to craft the news that shapes, 
drives, and directs public discourse on war and violence - can result in incomplete, 
inaccurate, or altered reporting. Reporting of this sort provides an unrealistic account of 
military actions throughout the world to a majority of the population. This obscured 
understanding of the realities of conflict can remove legitimacy from the experiences of 
those individuals and groups, such as soldiers, victims of systematic violence, wounded 
veterans, and refugees, who witnessed or endured horrors and atrocities firsthand. 
I argue that the symbolic disappearance of the body in various contexts is an 
example of state power exercised to help sustain a hegemonic authority structure. From 
the earliest days of modern wartime journalism, Western media outlets, and especially 
those in America, have consciously attempted to restrict, censor, and control stories and 
images of the wounded, dying, or dead body (Sontag 2003). Such actions create a 
veritable paradox, since in many ways war is indeed all about bodies, whether through 
outright killing, the taking of prisoners or slaves, assuming power over the vanquished, or 
other consequences of military actions. The void that remains when bodies are removed 
from wartime coverage is distinct and sizeable. 
I intend to explore these issues in several distinct ways. In the first chapter, I 
discuss the ways in which state hegemonic power, warfare, and the media are all linked 
very closely together (Chomsky 2002; Ehrenreich 1997; Herman and Chomsky 1988). 
Specifically, I examine how war is, in many ways, a religion of the state, how the state is 
a religion unto itself, and how the media are the primary tools that those in power use to 
retain control. This chapter also discusses resistance to these efforts, in addition to 
offering suggestions as to why the state has a vested interest in the perpetuation of war. 
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In the second chapter, I focus specifically on the symbolic disappearance of the 
body in several different (but primarily military) contexts, including atomic bomb victims 
of World War II, U.S. domestic atomic experimentation, Vietnam, the First Gulf War, 
and the current War on Terror. This section highlights techniques that are employed to 
obfuscate the violent reality of warfare, such as misleading rhetoric and the manipulation 
of battlefield images. Also, I discuss some of the links between language and power and 
how the elite use language to further their goals. 
Finally, in the third chapter, I explore the modem reality of wounded soldiers and 
their efforts to recover, and how these veterans are often problematic to the hegemonic 
interests of the state. Soldiers are surviving more and more horrific wounds than ever 
before, thanks in large part to medical advances and better protective gear. Once returned 
to society, however, these badly wounded soldiers serve as a living reminder of the true 
human costs of waging war and as such are problematic to the state. The result is that 
many wounded veterans return to civilian life and simply vanish, bearing severe bodily 
and psychological scars as a testament to war. Moreover, wounds are often becoming 
less visible and harder to categorize, such as those resulting from mental trauma or 
exposure to toxic chemicals or munitions. 
This thesis builds on the work of several scholars and extends some of their 
arguments into new areas. An exhaustive discussion of all the literature that covers these 
topics is unrealistic, but I will cover the major works that have served as a primary source 
of information and inspiration for this thesis. Primary among these is the work of Hugh 
Gusterson, especially People of the Bomb (2004), which provided my first introduction to 
the concept of the "disappearing body." Gusterson shows how warfare has become less 
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human over time and how the power of language can effectively remove people from 
what is, at its heart, a very human experience. This thesis uses a similar argument to 
show how the ability to make bodies disappear is an example of power, and especially 
that of the state, wielded to sustain hegemonic rule and the concerns of the elite. 
To make this argument, I must show that the state has a vested interest in warfare, 
a suggestion that builds heavily upon the work of numerous scholars. The work of 
Barbara Ehrenreich (1997) is especially useful here. Ehrenreich establishes firmly that 
war can be considered a religion of the state and that, indeed, the state itself can take on 
great religious significance. She also demonstrates why warfare remains an important 
rite of passage. This is true not just for individual soldiers, but also for those seeking and 
already in political office, and even for the state overall. 
I then discuss the links between the media and the state and how censorship is the 
primary tool that maintains a close connection between the two. Herman and Chomsky 
(1988) discuss ways in which the media are a tool of the state and reasons that the media 
often voluntarily censor information. I show how these arguments continue to hold true 
today, specifically by demonstrating that the media and the state both contribute to 
making bodies "vanish" and how this can further state goals such as consumerism and the 
strong support of the masses. They also show how the state, with heavy reliance on the 
popular media, keeps the masses distracted from asking too many critical questions. The 
work of James C. Scott ( 1990) provides valuable background on both why and how 
people submit to such authority, at least ostensibly, and ways in which people resist 
hegemonic power. 
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Also, using examples such as the activism of Cindy Sheehan and the existence of 
the left independent press, I show some strategies of resistance in America. But I also 
show how, as Scott suggests, continued submission to hegemonic state power can result 
over time in willing capitulation from the people and how this is a desired outcome for 
the state. Furthermore, building off arguments from Susan Sontag (2003), I suggest that 
in America in particular, the average citizen has a desire to remain at a distance from the 
realities of war and conflict, and so in many ways, whether consciously or not, welcomes 
efforts to restrict such information. Sontag's work also provides invaluable background 
on the history of the manipulation and censorship of print images from war (specifically 
those showing the dead or dying). I provide further examples from the modern War on 
Terror and discuss how, indeed, the single image continues to hold great power and the 
ability to make several ( often contradictory) statements at once. 
A significant portion of the second chapter focuses on language and how the 
ruling elite use discourse to maintain their hegemonic positions of power. The writings 
of Norman Fairclough ( e.g., 1989), a noted expert on the intersections of language, 
discourse, and power, are indispensable here. In discussing how modern print and 
broadcast media handle wartime coverage, I am indebted to the work of linguistic 
scholars such as Benjamin Whorf (Carroll 1956) and George Lakoff (1987), who argue 
that language can create meaning and reality (for an excellent summary, see Agar 1994). 
I use this to show how the American military and media implement language that makes 
bodies disappear to accomplish several things, including transforming "the enemy" into 
something subhuman. The work of Ehrenreich (1997) also contributes here, specifically 
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showing how the powerful can use language to imbue the dead with religious 
significance and use them as martyrs who died in service of the state. 
Hugh Gusterson and Susan Sontag also provide excellent background and 
examples of "body-free" reporting through time. Additionally, scholars such as 
Catharine Lutz (2001) and Carolyn Nordstrom (1997; 2004) provide examples showing 
that such reporting is not limited to America. Nordstrom (2004) also shows how defining 
the boundaries separating war and peace can be exceptionally difficult. Building from 
this, I discuss how these nebulous boundaries contribute to the "disappearing body" in 
that the media and those in power often (incorrectly) believe that a war happens in a 
distinct span of time, and as such the stories of those injured or killed long after major 
hostilities have ceased are rarely told. 
Although this thesis applies in many ways to all nation-states, the main focus is 
on America, because the United States provides a unique landscape on which to examine 
these issues. On this point, the works of Benedict Anderson ( 1991) and, once again, 
Barbara Ehrenreich ( 1997) were especially useful. Its relative geographic isolation ( at 
least from potentially hostile enemies), its 150 years of peace within its borders, and its 
massively diverse cultural population all contribute to its distinctive nature. In fact, 
America is the exemplar of an "imagined community" (Anderson 1991), wherein most 
citizens do not know one another personally yet still feel a strong connection of identity. 
Ehrenreich (1997:217) agrees, observing that the "melting pot" composition of America, 
coupled with a lack of deep historical connections that could link most of its inhabitants 
to a common past, makes the United States more "imagined" than most countries. In 
these communities, institutions such as the media, education, and entertainment all serve 
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to link their members at very fundamental levels. As a result, these institutions are 
critical to creating a sense of identity and have great power to shape the individual 
paradigms, morals, and values of each citizen. 
Also, a number of medical anthropologists, and more specifically those who work 
on the anthropology of the body, are important to this thesis. Scholars such as Margaret 
Lock (e.g., Lindenbaum and Lock 1993; 1993a; 1993b; 2002; Scheper-Hughes and Lock 
1987), Arthur Kleinman (e.g., 1995; 1991; 1994), Allan Young (e.g., 1980; 1982; 1993; 
1995), and Paul Farmer ( e.g., 1990; 1992; 1999; 2003) have called into question the links 
between culture and suffering. I discuss these issues with particular attention on how 
culture affects the suffering of veterans in light of the evolving nature of war and some of 
the "new" features of the modem battlefield. 
In addition to more traditional scholarship, the theoretical works of scholars who 
have written on power and its relation to the body serve as a useful framework for the 
entire thesis. If we accept, for example, that the body is a "writing surface" upon which 
the laws and norms of society are imprinted, as Pierre Clastres (1974: 153) argues 1, then 
examining the treatment of bodies by those in positions of authority, such as those who 
are able both to send people into battle and to erase their deeds from history, can 
illuminate the underlying power structures present within the media and the military and 
the accepted mores inculcated in the population. 
One can examine this question from several angles. These include the ways in 
which the media and the military treat the reporting of deaths, the psychological 
1 "Here Kafka designates the body as a writing surface, a surface able to receive the law's readable text." 
[Kafka designe ici le corps comme surface d'ecriture, comme surface apte a recevoir le texte lisible de la 
loi.] 
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processes of soldiers who must face killing and death, and society's treatment of 
individuals who return from war somehow changed. Clastres (1974:157) goes on to 
suggest that "society prints its mark on the body of its youth .... The mark acts as an 
obstacle to forgetting; the body carries the traces of a memory printed upon it; the body is 
a memory. "2 Even though Clastres was referring to rites of passage into primitive 
societies, other scholars, such as Christopher Taylor (2002), have extended these very 
same arguments into examinations of violence, torture, and killing. In fact, I suggest that 
since warfare continues to be an important rite of passage, the work of Clastres is 
especially relevant. Also, Michel Foucault ( 1977) writes that institutions in addition to 
the state, including the military and the penal system, can serve a similar purpose of 
imprinting individuals with culturally-accepted values and ideas. In these situations, 
then, the body acts as a canvas upon which systems of power inscribe the paradigms by 
which individuals live. When these paradigms, which might include (at a simplistic 
level) ideas such as "killing is wrong" or "America is peaceful," encounter 
incompatibilities, as they often do during times of war, fundamental shifts happen (or 
attempts are made to prevent such shifts) among people, soldiers, and those in authority. 
It is precisely these shifts that this work attempts to address. 
Dobie' s article in Maxim brings up one important question: why would this type 
of article appear in such a publication? Maxim is certainly not the apogee of investigative 
journalism. The magazine bills itself as "The best thing to happen to men since women," 
2 
[[La] societe imprime sa marque sur le corps des jeunes gens .... La marque est un obstacle a l'oubli, le 
corps lui-meme porte imprimees sur soi les traces d'un souvenir, le corps est un memoire.] 
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and frequently features articles related to sex, alcohol, automobiles, gadgets, men's 
fashion, and entertainment. Here, for example, is a sample of articles from the same 
November issue: "Cars of the Year": "100 Things You Need to Know About Women": 
superficial interviews (with provocative pictures) of three attractive, young actresses: and 
a "how-to" article covering skeet shooting. So why, then, would an article that addresses 
such a critical and large problem as the mental health and social rejection of American 
veterans be buried among such flotsam? Why do publications such as Time and 
Newsweek not feature these issues more prominently? Why do the media not devote 
more attention to what is clearly an epidemic problem, or to the horrifying details of the 
conflicts that soldiers face everyday, or to the seeming inability of the military to address 
such issues? And when the popular media do cover these issues, why do most people 
seem largely emotionally unaffected? The Maxim article is a microcosm of the situation: 
within its pages, the article will likely disappear, perhaps skipped over by its core 
demographic readers in favor of the more prevalent low-brow content filling the issue, an 
issue that itself will be discarded and forgotten when the next edition arrives with yet 
another scantily-clad covergirl. 
This is not to argue that Maxim is guilty of some journalistic offense; on the 
contrary, its editorial staff made a good decision by publishing the piece. Maxim, like 
other similar magazines, relies on sensationalistic topics generally devoid of serious 
content to drive circulation. Therefore the appearance of the article was surprising, but 
nonetheless welcome. No, the problem lies not with Maxim, but rather with the media, 
the government, and the military in general. Nor is this underreporting a recent 
phenomenon. An examination of the modem coverage of military operations shows that, 
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indeed, those in power have consistently made decisions that restricted, altered, toned 
down, or otherwise changed the content that was meant for widespread dissemination, 
especially to the popular media and, ultimately, to the people. The reasons for these 
decisions are certainly varied, and will be discussed throughout this thesis, but generally 
involve attempts to represent combat as less brutal than it truly is, or to put a positive spin 
on the military and its operations. As I have mentioned, one of the key ways to 
accomplish these goals is to make the dead and dying "disappear" from footage, images, 
or reports. As the next chapters will show, both the media and the military have a long 
history of doing exactly that. 
Chapter One: The State, Warfare, Media, and Resistance 
During times of universal deceit, telling the truth becomes a revolutionary act. 
-George Orwell 
One does not establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution; one makes a 
revolution in order to establish a dictatorship. 
-George Orwell 
1 1  
This chapter explores several issues relating to the hegemonic power of the state, 
concentrating on the United States. My overall goal is to demonstrate that, in many 
circumstances, warfare is often a positive event for those in power. As such, maintaining 
control over war and its reporting is a paramount concern for the state. Through an 
understanding of why war is an important tool for those in power, we can better 
understand how and why so much effort is put into controlling exactly who knows what, 
and when. In short, this chapter is about power, and how war is an exercise of this power 
that is not, at least from the state's point of view, necessarily something to be avoided. 
The initial section of this chapter focuses on concepts from Ehrenreich's  Blood 
Rites (1 997). First, it examines the _state and its treatment of warfare and the dead and 
shows how the state has turned war into a religion. Next, it discusses how the state has 
become a religion unto itself that is manifested through the extreme patriotism, and even 
nationalism, of its citizens. This transformation has many consequences, not the least of 
which is that as a religion, the state commands even more authority above and beyond its 
elected secular role. 
The second section looks at the use of the media as a tool of the state in its efforts 
to maintain a hegemonic system of power (see, e.g., Chomsky 2002; Herman and 
Chomsky 1988). The main focus is the strong symbiotic connections between the media 
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and the state. As a result of these connections, the media have a vested interest in 
furthering the goals of the state as opposed to reporting the whole truth. 
Next, the discussion shifts to those who try in various ways to resist the 
established system. Here I include information on organized attempts to disseminate 
alternate information, with specific emphasis on the "left" independent press. I also 
include, however, a brief discussion about ways in which individuals can and do resist 
systems of hegemonic control. Finally, this chapter concludes with a look at how 
political and military leaders have had to adjust their reporting of information related to 
war and violence in light of the age of mass communication where many people, at least 
in developed countries, have greater access to resources such as the Internet. 
Warfare and the State as Religion 
Religion is a good example of a hegemonic power structure that throughout 
history has often been used by those in power to control the masses. Whether through a 
direct theocracy or by more subtle influences, the power of the state and the power of 
religion often go hand-in-hand. In many historical times and places, distinguishing where 
religion ends and secular rule begins can be quite a challenge. With two systems of 
power as expansive as state politics and religion, one might expect to find several 
similarities between the two, and this is indeed the case. This section examines two 
central ideas in particular: first, that warfare is indeed a type of state religion and, second, 
that the state itself and its symbols have come to have religious significance (Ehrenreich 
1997). 
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Warf are and religion share a significant number of common features. In both, 
only the elite are afforded access to particular areas ( e.g., the pulpit, the command 
center), or to specific bits of knowledge ( e.g., sacred texts, classified documents). Both 
generally have clearly defined authoritative hierarchies that leave little room for personal 
interpretation. Also, the language used is often rather technical and specialized. The 
military is filled, for instance, with acronyms and abbreviations; several religions rely on 
ancient languages, such as koine Greek, Aramaic, Latin, and Sanskrit. The use of a 
specialized language can make it difficult for outsiders to understand what is happening 
and can remove the ability of those not a part of the "inner circle" to question the 
leadership. Furthermore, ideas of liminal spaces that, once entered, cause a 
transformation are generally common to both institutions and are basic to most rites of 
passage. The concept of liminality is important, especially in military contexts, as it 
creates feelings of equality, solidarity, community, and unity, which Victor Turner (1974) 
labeled "communitas." 
Many religions throughout history have played key roles in rites of passage, and 
the religion of warfare is no different. This extends beyond the initiation and 
transformation of a citizen into a soldier at, for instance, boot camp. As a whole, warfare 
serves as an initiation for many types of people. This is a key point: more than just 
becoming a soldier, one must participate in actual warfare in order to become fully a part 
of the cult of the military. Many cultures in history have not acknowledged someone as a 
full member of their societies until that person has shed blood in combat ( or killed an 
enemy, or returned with a scalp, etc.) (Ehrenreich 1997:126-129). In today's  world, those 
who have achieved status as military commanders, especially during actual conflict, have 
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often translated this military success into political and financial success, whether by 
holding public office or by being appointed to serve high up in government. In the 
private sector, many companies prefer to hire those with strong military backgrounds, as 
those employees will likely be used to taking orders and are comfortable with a 
hierarchical chain of command. Also, in some industries, former soldiers make attractive 
employees since they can bring more wealth to the company by, for instance, influencing 
contracting or procurement decisions through their network of military contacts. 
Even for those in power, warfare can serve a vital function as a rite of passage. 
As the old maxim goes, "War makes leaders and leaders make war," and this certainly 
continues to ring true. The New York Times, following the American invasion of 
Panama, announced that President Bush had passed his "initiation rite" because of his 
"willingness to shed blood" (Apple 1 989). For political leaders who have little or no 
military experience, demonstrating the will to use force can serve both as a statement to 
the world and as a reassurance to the general population that the state leadership can and 
will use military power. 
The idea that war and religion are closely tied together is easily seen in the way 
warfare is celebrated. Ehrenreich ( 1 997) notes that throughout much of history, mass 
rallies in support of war share much in common with religious celebrations, such as the 
loss of individuality and collective hysteria. For its part, she notes, the church can 
usually be counted on to sacralize war efforts and generally is not immune from the 
community excitement present at the onset of conflict. She also argues that even during 
times of peace, sacred spaces such as veterans' cemeteries and war memorials serve to 
maintain the link between warfare and the sacred. Furthermore, military bands and high-
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ranking officers are regular features at state functions and often take on ceremonial roles. 
One of the strongest pieces of evidence for this link, however, is the American flag. The 
flag itself acts as a lynchpin that secures the connection between warfare as a religion and 
the state as a religion. The flag is a symbol both of the military and of the state. In fact, 
many people would argue that if someone does not support the state, then that person 
also, by default, does not support the military. In 1900, a pamphlet urged America to 
"develop, define, and protect the cult of her flag" and keep the Star Spangled Banner 
(which it calls the "symbol of that cult") "inviolate as are the emblems of all religions" 
( quoted in Goldstein 1995: 13). The Daughters of the American Revolution noted that 
"what the cross is to our church, the flag is to our country" and that the flag had been 
"made sacred and holy by bloody sacrifice" ( quoted in Goldstein 1995: 14). 
The American flag is ubiquitous; it can be found in every government building, 
virtually every school, several churches, public spaces such as parks, and many private 
homes. Prescribed rules tell citizens when to fly it, how to handle and fold it, and how to 
destroy it. Flags are draped over the caskets of military dead and presented to the spouse 
or another close relative, and indeed flags often serve a vital part in rituals of the state. In 
fact, America even celebrates Flag Day, which is a national holiday. Many school 
districts require students to pledge allegiance to the flag starting at a very young age 
when the children cannot possibly understand the significance of what they are saying. 
Also, from time to time, leaders have proposed various laws ( and even a Constitutional 
amendment) banning the burning or other destruction and desecration of the flag. All of 
this amounts to what is, essentially, a form of worship of the core symbol of America. 
When viewed in this manner, the flag is directly equated with the state as a religious icon, 
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just as the cross is linked with Christianity, the crescent is emblematic of Islam, or the 
Star of David equals Judaism. Interestingly, this fetishization of the national flag is not 
found in all cultures. Ehrenreich ( 1997 :218) points out that even within comparable 
English-speaking nations, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, flag 
worship is essentially nonexistent, and private ownership of flags is similarly rare. 
One key difference between most formalized religions and the religion of the state 
is the presence of a defined central focus of worship. In the case of organized religion, 
this role is usually held by a god of one type or another. Throughout history, many heads 
of state performed a similar function, as did the emperor in ancient Rome or the deified 
ruler in Japan. Even in more recent times, monarchs often would claim that they had a 
divine right to rule and were chosen by God to lead the nation. But in most modem 
states, including America, leadership turns over at a relatively set pace, and one person 
cannot remain in power for too long. In the absence of a strong central cult leader around 
which to develop a religious following, the focus of worship shifts instead to more 
abstract ideas such as "freedom" and "democracy." This is not to say that those in power 
cannot align themselves very closely with these concepts and become their standard 
bearer throughout the world, since frequently they do. 
The effects of equating war with religion can be quite severe. Given too much 
free rein, the idea that warfare is in some way a religious event sanctioned by the state 
can reinforce an absolute notion of patriotism or nationalism (Ehrenreich 1997: see esp. 
chps. 1 2  and 13). That is, if someone does not support the actions of the military, he or 
she could be labeled as "unpatriotic" or worse. In the same way, disagreeing with or 
speaking out against a religion can lead to excommunication. When the aims of the 
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military coincide with those of the government, citizens often must support the armed 
forces or risk some form of punishment or ostracism. 
This section has discussed how warfare and the state both share many features in 
common with more traditional religions. Like most religions, the state has a vested 
interest in gaining the support of as many people as possible. One of the main ways this 
has been accomplished is through the media and their ability to shape the thoughts of the 
average citizen. 
Media as a Tool of the State 
Most people today believe that the media are supposed to remain unbiased, and 
indeed many news agencies present their coverage in such a manner (consider, for 
example, Fox News's pledge to provide "fair and balanced" reporting\ Although this is 
a nice ideal, the fact is that media outlets throughout history have been guilty of 
significant bias. Many scholars argue that bias is indeed alive and well in modern media 
and that no single source can present a truly neutral viewpoint. Since many consumers of 
Western media do not take the time to scrutinize multiple sources and form their own 
opinions, the media have countless opportunities to present skewed or incomplete views 
of conflicts. Herman and Chomsky (1988), for instance, argue that these views go a long 
way towards becoming the opinions of the masses. They furthermore suggest that in 
America in particular, there is little need for direct censorship since the media do such an 
effective job of creating and shaping the worldview of the masses through a process of 
3 Although this is a legitimate pledge from Fox News, the documentary Outfoxed: Rupert Murdoch 's War 
on Journalism demonstrates their strong conservative bias. 
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self-censorship. Just as important as the choice of footage or images to show are those 
the media do not show. The decision not to show images is a form of censorship. 
Censorship occurs for two reasons: either it is imposed, or it is voluntary. Almost as soon 
as cameras became practical enough for use in war zones, both types of censorship were 
enacted. For example, both the French and the German governments controlled which 
official photographers were allowed near the fronts during World War I, and their images 
often had to be approved and released through government or military offices (Sontag 
2003:64). Unfortunately, an examination of imposed censorship is especially difficult 
because determining what was not released can prove virtually, if not absolutely, 
impossible. 
Self-censorship is an interesting and powerful concept. Herman and Chomsky 
(1988; see also Jardine 1993) present what is perhaps the best summary of modern 
censorship in mass media. They argue that one of the primary goals of media outlets is 
not to keep the public informed, but rather to keep the people entertained. Furthermore, 
they suggest that Western media are under the control of a dominant elite and exist to 
serve its needs. As a result, they write, the quality and accuracy of the news suffers and 
comes to rely primarily on short sound bites that maintain the status quo rather than 
presenting true investigative journalism. They show that editors, anchors, and others in 
positions to decide what is reported frequently choose to print only material that is 
politically or economically friendly. Several filters actively select what is and is not fit 
for dissemination to general audiences. Herman and Chomsky point out, for example, 
that in many countries, including America, media outlets must obtain government 
licenses (e.g., from the FCC) in order to function. They are therefore all subject to 
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potential government control or harassment if they do not maintain what the authors refer 
to as an "establishment orientation." 
Advertisers form a second de facto filter for the media. Without advertisers' 
financial support, most media outlets would cease to function. As such, the media must 
be very aware of what advertisers, which are generally culturally conservative, consider 
acceptable. This filter reveals one of the core links between the media and the state: 
capitalism. The United States, for example, has a vested interest in everybody buying 
and selling goods. This means that not only should domestic consumers feel confident in 
the direction in which the nation is headed (for example, that the current administration's 
economic plans will not trigger a recession), but also that America should be represented 
in the media in as positive a light as possible, so that international vendors and consumers 
will buy and sell U.S. goods and services. 
The third filter, according to Herman and Chomsky, is the need for constantly 
fresh stories, which usually means favoring "reliable" sources such as government press 
secretaries. Using standard sources, which will likely support existing administrative 
policies, reduces the need to check facts and the need for potentially costly investigation. 
This too brings up a critical point: the media need the government, as those with political 
power are a constant and primary source of information, interviews, etc. Without them, 
media outlets would have a much more difficult time reporting what many consider to be 
key stories. For this reason, it is in the best interests of the media not to question the 
administration's policies too critically. The old maxim "Don't bite the hand that feeds 
you" is certainly at work. 
20 
Another filter is the potential for what Herman and Chomsky refer to as "flak." 
"Flak" consists of letters, comments, lawsuits, speeches, and so on from citizens 
protesting, for instance, a particular story or program. These can be quite costly to media 
outlets, which prefer to control the fallout from an unpopular news item. Stories that 
show graphic content are most at risk for such reactions, and any story that delves into 
the brutal effects of war likely would fall into this category. The CIA has an official term 
for unintended consequences of foreign conflict that are deliberately withheld fro� the 
general population: "blowback" (Jarecki 2006). These "unintended consequences" could 
include, for example, civilian deaths and heavy troop losses. The former CIA official 
interviewed in Why We Fight (Jarecki 2006) said that these types of material are withheld 
so that when and if any of it leaks out to the public, resulting questions are often out of 
context and long after the incident. This clearly demonstrates that those in power are 
constantly altering and otherwise filtering the flow of news and information long before it 
reaches the public in an attempt to minimize or eliminate any potential negative reactions. 
One excellent example of self-censorship Herman and Chomsky ( 1988) cite is the 
lack of almost any media coverage of the East Timor genocide at the hands of Indonesian 
forces. The Indonesian invasion and occupation started in 197 5 and continued until the 
end of official Indonesian occupation in 1999. Recent statistical analyses indicate that 
roughly 102,000 individuals died during that time period from killings, hunger, and 
illness (Silva and Ball 2006). In contrast, other atrocities coincident with East Timor, 
such as the Cambodian genocide under Pol Pot, received significant media attention. The 
reason they give is that unlike Cambodia, Indonesia is the recipient of large amounts of 
global aid from countries such as America and Japan, topping five billion dollars 
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annually by the 1980s. As a result of this aid, media outlets decided that it was not in 
their best interests to report, for instance, that America was providing economic and 
military assistance to a country participating in genocide, and therefore virtually all opted 
to self-censor any news relating to the situation. More often than not, photo editors, 
journalists, and others in charge cite "poor taste" or give other weak reasons when 
confronted about these types of issues (Sontag 2003 :68-69). 
In addition to self-censorship, direct censorship also continues to play a role in the 
media's coverage of warfare and violence. All levels and offices of the government and 
military could potentially contribute to censorship of data, stories, reports, or other 
information, especially information that those in power feel could have negative 
outcomes. One recent notable example in America is the ban on footage or images 
showing the returning coffins of dead soldiers from Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. 
During Vietnam, for instance, correspondents regularly had extensive access to troops, 
battlefields, and other sources. During that time, news reports routinely showed bodies 
being loaded onto helicopters, fresh from battle, or returning home in flag-draped caskets. 
These images undoubtedly added fuel to the fire of anti-war protestors and did nothing to 
bolster waning public opinion as the war dragged on. Senator Jim McDermott of 
Washington, who served in the Navy during Vietnam, echoes this sentiment: "As people 
began to see the reality of it and see the 55,000 people who were killed coming back in 
body bags, they became more and more upset by the war" (CBS News 2004). The 
government and military have learned that lesson. In March of 2003, the following 
directive from the Pentagon was given to all U.S. military bases: 
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There will be no arrival ceremonies for, or media coverage of, deceased 
military personnel returning to or departing from Ramstein [Germany] 
airbase or Dover [Del.] base, to include interim stops. (Milbank 2003) 
The government justification for the ban invariably cites the rights of the soldiers' 
relatives, claiming an attempt to prevent further undue suffering, even though no specific 
information as to the identity of the deceased is evident in the pictures. Senator 
McDermott, however, disagrees that privacy is the primary motivation behind the ban: 
"This is not about privacy. This is about trying to keep the country from facing the 
reality of war" (CBS News 2004). Military leaders are certainly aware that images of 
returning dead can sway public opinion about a particular conflict. In 1999, the then­
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General Henry H. Shelton, admitted that any 
decision to use military force takes into account "the Dover test" (Milbank 2003), 
referring to the public's reaction to images of dead young men and women arriving 
home. Such a ban appears to be a one-way street, as American media outlets were not 
restricted from showing photos of the corpses of, for example, Saddam Hussein's  sons, 
Uday and Qusay (although many chose not to air the footage anyway). 
Seeking the Truth: Means of Resistance 
The previous section examined the links between state power and the media. For 
the most part, media outlets have a vested interest in supporting the goals of the state and 
helping to maintain the status quo. Returning to Herman and Chomsky (1988), recall that 
they assert that one of the primary functions of the media, beyond simply helping to 
maintain the hegemonic power of the state, is to keep the masses entertained. By 
distracting the population with sporting events, movies, and reality television, media 
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outlets contribute to keeping most people in the dark about some of the larger stories 
impacting the world. It is as if Herman and Chomsky are echoing the sentiment of Fire 
Captain Beatty in Bradbury's  Fahrenheit 451: "Give the people contests they win by 
remembering the words to more popular songs. . . .  Don't give them slippery stuff like 
philosophy or sociology to tie things up with. That way lies melancholy." 
Unfortunately, because most of the population would choose to live in a world free of 
violence, this is not a difficult sell. 
To illustrate the power the media have in shaping the collective unconscious 
understanding of a place, Susan Sontag writes that only sixty years ago horrors on an 
almost unimaginable scale happened throughout Europe, but that now Europe is generally 
thought of as peaceful. Horror, she states (2003:71), has vacated Europe "for long 
enough to make the present pacified state of affairs seem inevitable." Gore Vidal echoed 
this sentiment by stating in the documentary Why We Fight that Americans live in the 
"United States of Amnesia" and purposely forget much of the nation's darker history 
( Jarecki 2006). Most citizens have an understandable preference for living in a 
community, nation, and world that is more peaceful than violent, happier than sad, and 
where the past is relegated firmly to history. 
Aaron Brown, a former CNN anchor, said that he realized something was wrong 
after he spent four straight hours covering the minutiae of the murder of Robert Blake's  
wife (Conrad 2006). He wondered why, for instance, did the networks devote so much 
time to a "low-level celebrity" shooting on a day when four Canadian soldiers died in 
Iraq. He posits that his eventual dismissal was the result of his criticisms that the 
network was more obsessed with "lurid celebrity gossip" than with important news. His 
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termination is even more interesting since he has won several journalism awards, 
including the prestigious Edward R. Murrow award for his reporting of the September 
11th tragedy. In the end, Brown argues that the media should focus on the six to ten 
important stories on any given day instead of reporting every little thing as critical 
breaking news. This will not happen, he adds, as long as news reporting remains a 
business and the population does not demand more meaningful coverage. 
Yet not all people are dissuaded from seeking coverage with more depth and, 
possibly, a stronger sense of truth. In America, for instance, several "liberal" or "left­
wing" independent media outlets attempt to uncover what they believe is a more 
historically-informed perspective at the heart of all the popular spin. These include The 
Progressive (progressive.org), Z Magazine (zmag.org), The Nation (thenation.com), and 
Mother Jones (motherjones.com). The problem is that these publications reach such a 
small percentage of the population when compared with traditional television and print 
sources that they are but a small irritation to the overall power structure. They struggle at 
a grass-roots level to provide the public with alternative voices to the popular media, but 
they fight an uphill battle against quite the juggernaut. 
Along with groups, individuals can and do resist what they believe to be wrong or 
oppressive policies. One of the best modem examples of this is Cindy Sheehan, the 
mother of a young man killed in Iraq who has since campaigned tirelessly against 
America's  War on Terror. She is perhaps best known for camping outside President 
George: W. Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas for a month while demanding an audience 
with him (which she never received). This protest drew sometimes 1,500 visitors a day 
in support of her efforts. More recently, she was invited to the 2006 State of the Union 
25 
address, from which she was arrested, escorted out of the chamber, and held for some 
hours in a detention cell for wearing a shirt that counted the number of American dead as 
a result of the War on Terror. In Cohen v. California, the Supreme Court ruled that 
wearing clothing that speaks out against government actions is protected under free 
speech. 4 But Cindy Sheehan is not the only person who has been harassed recently for 
wearing anti-war clothing. In fact, a man was arrested while eating lunch with his son at 
a mall in the state of New York for wearing a shirt Gust purchased in the same mall) 
reading "Give Peace a Chance" (Reuters 2003). 
In neither of these situations did anyone do anything "wrong," at least in the legal 
sense. But what they did do, and what those who want to resist an exceptionally 
hegemonic system often do, is violate what James C. Scott ( 1990:2) calls the "public 
transcript" that was appropriate to their situations. A "public transcript" is simply the 
"open interaction between subordinates and those who dominate." As a simple example, 
it is expected that feudal peasants treat their lord with a great deal of respect, even though 
they may actually loathe him. 
This concept applies to more than just people; it can also, for instance, be used to 
understand why most mainstream media outlets do not rock the proverbial boat of those 
in power. Scott ( 1990:2) argues that "the public performance of the subordinate will, out 
of prudence, fear, and the desire to curry favor, be shaped to appeal to the expectations of 
the powerful." Furthermore, he goes on to suggest (1990:3) that the greater the disparity 
between the powerful and the subordinate, and the more arbitrarily this power is 
4 For the text of the ruling, as well as other background information, see 
http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/cas/comm/free_speech/cohen.html. 
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exercised, the more "ritualistic" and "stereotyped" the public transcript will be. 
Therefore hegemonies have a distinct need to make that power gap as large as possible, 
so that those underneath will behave more and more like automatons who are less and 
less likely to question the existing power structure. 
One might assume that just because someone performs a particular public 
transcript in deference to those in power, that person does not necessarily buy into the 
message or goals of the dominant elite, and that therefore the performance does nothing 
to shape actual belief. Scott ( 1 990: 10) disagrees, however, stating that "those obliged to 
act a mask will eventually find that their faces have grown to fit that mask," or in other 
words, that the "practice of subordination . . .  produces, in time, its own legitimacy." Seen 
in this way, hegemonies have a real interest in creating as broad of a power differential as 
they can, since repeated performance of the transcript of the subordinate will literally 
craft the belief in the performer that to do so is natural and right. In fiction, this is clearly 
illustrated in Orwell' s 1984, where the vast majority of the citizens living under an 
extreme hegemony simply accept life the way it is and do not question the authority 
system or its right to rule. 
So the question remains : Why would the state put so much effort into filtering and 
restricting information related to warfare? What is it about war that needs to be 
controlled by those with power and shielded from those without? On the one hand, it 
might be easy to dismiss warfare by saying that nothing good comes of it. To do so, 
however, would be a mistake, at least from the state's perspective. 
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The Benefits of War 
The sad reality is that many governments have little reason to cease making war. 
I discussed above some of the more abstract benefits of warfare, such as its ability to 
forge leaders and its continued relevance as a right of passage. Aside from these, 
however, war often provides several concrete benefits as well. 
Perhaps the most important positive aspect of war to those in power is the 
economic impact it often has. History has shown that no better economic stimulus exists 
than warfare. Particularly during and after World War II, modem industry realized the 
boon that comes with global conflict, which creates massive contracts. In turn, this 
necessitates additional labor, generating more capital at the consumer level, and therefore 
more disposable income. For businesses, war is a money-making machine. In more 
modem conflicts, in addition to the standard defense contracts, a growing number of 
service contracts have been generated as well, such as for food service, laundry , facility 
maintenance, and so forth (see, e.g. ,  Jarecki 2006). Although- it is difficult to estimate the 
dollar amount tied to the economic impact of war, given an annual U.S. defense budget 
approaching half a trillion dollars, it is safe to say it is in the hundreds of billions, if not 
. trillions, of dollars (International Consortium of Investigative Journalists 2005 ; Jarecki 
2006) . One does not have to think too hard to realize that the longer a war can go on, and 
the larger the geographic area over which it is spread, the more contracts, services, and 
support are necessary to ensure the smooth operation of the deployment. Furthermore, 
often future political leaders arise out of major players in the industry, and big business is 
one of the strongest lobbying forces on the planet. In short, the ties that bind industry , 
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government, and war are exceptionally strong, and this provides a very real reason to 
promote what is, literally, the business of war. 
To say that war is a money-making machine, however, is not specific enough. 
For while many assume that military spending contributes to economic growth by 
stimulating research in the private sector, by providing numerous service contracts that 
require the work of thousands of employees, by training soldiers with vocational skills 
that they apply outside the military after discharge, and through the infusion of soldiers' 
paychecks into the national economy, Catherine Lutz (2001 :172-178) shows that this is 
not the case. Citing Anderson (1982), she asserts that one billion dollars spent on 
military procurement creates 26,000 jobs, but the same amount devoted to healthcare 
creates 37,000 jobs, and when funneled into education, 48,000 positions.5 
Furthermore, Lutz (2001 :289), citing Abell (1992), writes that an increase m 
defense spending leads to an increase in unemployment. The impact of this 
unemployment, according to her, is unevenly distributed among gender and ethnicity. 
White males suffer the fewest negative consequences, while African-Americans are 
hardest hit. Similarly, even when funding is diverted into nonmilitary sectors, 
unemployment decreases for all groups, but again white males reap the most benefits and 
African-American males see the least improvement in employment opportunities. 
Women of either ethnicity fall in the middle on both accounts. 
5 
One of the main reasons for th is, Lutz (200 1 :  1 74) notes, is that the military tends to hire fewer people at a 
higher rate per capita in, for example, science and engineering fields. This translates, simply, into fewer 
jobs for the same money. An interesting result of this, she claims, is that in industrialized countries where 
military spending is less of a national focus, such as in Germany and Japan, these same professionals often 
end up working in, for instance, the auto or mass transit fields. This results in improvements to consumer 
goods and national infrastructure that benefit a greater percentage of the population. 
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Why, then, if military spending contributes to fewer jobs and higher 
unemployment, is there such pressure to raise defense spending? In the United States, 
Lutz (2001: 177) asserts that several complimentary interests are at work to ensure that 
money flows freely and swiftly into the military. Specifically, pointing to the work of 
Marullo (see, e.g., 1992), she defines five actors who all have an active interest in a rising 
defense budget. These are: military contractors, the Department of Defense, weapons 
laboratories, Congress, and industrial laborers within the military. Collectively, these 
groups assert pressure to maintain high levels of military spending. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, these groups exude power, and their ranks are filled with society's  elite. 
In addition, however, these groups also constitute that unique American institution: the 
military-industrial complex. 
In his farewell address to the nation on January 17, 1961, President Eisenhower 
coined the phrase "military-industrial complex" and warned that its power must be 
checked lest it be grievously abused: 
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms 
industry is new in the American experience. The total influence -
economic, political, even spiritual - is felt in every city, every Statehouse, 
every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need 
for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave 
implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the 
very structure of our society. 
In the councils of government, we must guard against the 
acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the 
military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of 
misplaced power exists and will persist. 
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our 
liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. 
Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing 
of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful 
methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together. 
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Eisenhower brings up several important points in this part of the speech. First, he notes 
that the influence of the military establishment is ubiquitous, even stating that its 
influence extends into the "spiritual" arena. He warns that people must not underestimate 
its "grave implications," even saying that the "very structure of our society" is at stake. 
He can also see the danger of the "unwarranted influence" of the military-industrial 
complex. Most important, however, is that he calls attention to the "potential for the 
disastrous rise of misplaced power." Interestingly, he believes that the only force that can 
guard against this is "an alert and knowledgeable citizenry," which is the very citizenry 
that, as I have shown, is consistently and purposefully shielded from a good deal of 
information. 
Another reason exists to make war, at least on occasion. Warfare often unites a 
nation, or at least pretends to. One of the best ways it accomplishes this is by providing a 
new direction for a nation, one behind which government and citizens alike can rally. In 
effect, war is a tool that can be used to revive and refresh a flagging nation (see, e.g., 
Ehrenreich 1 997 :222; see also Hegel 1 99 1 ). So for instance, following 9/1 1 ,  those in 
power in America have given a new goal to the nation: defeat terrorism. They have 
cloaked the United States in the armor of the bringer of peace, freedom, and democracy 
to the world, which will be accomplished by rooting out and destroying all terrorism. 
Ideas like this reinforce the hegemony of the powerful elite, since only they and their 
army are equipped to fight such a battle. Average citizens are told that they can sustain 
this effort by continuing to keep voting the same people into office, serving in the 
military, and giving 100 percent moral support to these goals. To do otherwise, as we 
have seen, makes one unpatriotic, un-American, or worse. 
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But is this campaign of information control always successful? The answer is, of 
course, no. In this era of instant access to massive amounts of information and data, 
maintaining a tight control over the flow of that information is nearly impossible. But 
what those in power can do is make certain that what is presented and available is 
somewhat sanitized. Through a mix of direct and voluntary censorship, political and 
military leaders can, to the best of their ability, present the "least bad" of available 
images, stories, and so forth. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed, in broad terms, the links that bind together state 
power, warfare, and the media, as well as efforts to struggle against such connections. As 
I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, its purpose is to serve as a foundation 
upon which the rest of the thesis will stand. Before moving forward, it is important to 
understand why those in power have a rather vested interest in the continuation of 
warfare, and how the media factor into the mix as an integral part of the plan to control 
what information is available to the public. Understanding the role of mainstream media 
as a tool of the state is critical before moving forward, because if we accept the link 
between the government and the media (where the media are, in effect, the mouthpiece of 
the government and, by extension, the military), then an examination of the language 
used to report on the dead and dying can reveal a great deal about the intents and desires 
of the state. The next chapter covers these issues in-depth and provides numerous 
examples of how those in power craft the news to present what is often a markedly 
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different picture from the "complete" reality ( or at least, as close as is perhaps possible to 
some objective "truth"). 
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Chapter Two: Bodies in Print and Broadcast Media 
Television brought the brutality of war into the comfort of the living room. Vietnam was 
lost in the living rooms of America-not on the battlefields of Vietnam. 
-Marshall McLuhan 
Early in life I had noticed that no event is ever correctly reported in a newspaper. 
-George Orwell 
Unlike the previous chapter, which focused on abstract concepts of warfare, state 
power, censorship, the media, and resistance, this chapter discusses the specifics of how 
the concept of the "disappearing body" is an example of state power used to maintain 
hegemonic rule and enforce the status quo. In other words, if the first chapter 
demonstrates why states have a vested interest in obscuring the effects of war, this 
chapter shows how they do so. Much of the discussion that follows focuses on warfare 
and on how bodies can "disappear" in military contexts; it centers especially on 
America's  conflicts. Examples will come from other areas than war, however, such as 
military testing on civilians during times of peace, underrepresentation and 
misrepresentation of women and minorities, and deaths attributed to sanctions. 
Restriction and Manipulation of Violent Images 
Warfare has always been a rather bloody business. Consider numbers from some 
of the bloodiest battles of all time: 65,000+ soldiers fell at the battle of Cannae in 216 
BCE against Hannibal during the Second Punic War; as many as 28,000 men died at the 
Battle of Towton in 1461 during the Wars of the Roses; and a minimum of 40,000 
Russian and 28,000 French troops perished at the Battle of Borodino in 1 812 during the 
Napoleonic Wars. Yet, until relatively recently, accounts of military campaigns were 
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primarily oral, although occasionally written or artistic representations (paintings, 
tapestries, columns, arches, cartoons, etc.) existed. Furthermore, when these existed, the 
"official" artistic or literary accounts of battles and campaigns often were created years 
after the fact and were fashioned so as to glorify the general or the political leader 
responsible for the victory. Trajan's Column, for example, was completed in 113 CE to 
commemorate the emperor's victory over the Dacians; the campaigns themselves had 
been waged in 101-102 and 105-106. Similarly, the Arc de Triomphe in Paris was 
commissioned by Napoleon following his 1806 victory at Austerlitz, but it was not fully 
completed until 1836. In short, the majority of the people generally had no reliable 
means to appreciate the scope or violence of warfare, which remained almost exclusively 
in the realm of politicians and of soldiers who actually fought in engagements. Except 
for the relative few who participated in the action directly, recollections of military 
operations fell into the realm of generic collective memory, more story than reality, 
wholly detached from daily existence. 
This situation remained in place for centuries, until the advent of the printing 
press in the 1450s allowed for more regular written report. Even so, mass printing would 
be unavailable until roughly 18 12  with the invention of the steam press and the 
subsequent creation of truly modern newspapers. Any military accounts covered were 
still just reported with words, often crowded onto pages and competing for attention 
against other stories. The problem of author bias became even more apparent and indeed 
was certainly compounded by such factors as an editor's personal bias, the particular 
political slant of a given newspaper or periodical, or the intended goal of the piece (i.e., 
anti-war, pro-government, etc.). 
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The media's coverage of warfare, however, changed forever in the 1 9th century 
with the invention of photography (see, e.g., Sontag 2003). · With the advent of the 
photograph, the masses could, for essentially the first time, witness firsthand the bloody 
results of war. At the same time, however, military and media outlets were able to exert 
even greater control over the reporting and publication of violent images. 
In 1855, not long after the invention of photography, Roger Fenton became the 
first war photographer when he covered the Crimean War at the behest of the British 
government and Prince Albert. Fenton's work, and that of his contemporaries such as 
Mathew Brady during the American Civil War, marked a paradigm shift for war 
coverage. No longer did people need to rely on the written word alone for descriptions of 
conflict; here was the stark truth, displayed for all to see and bringing the distant horrors 
very near. Vivid images could replace colorless numbers in accounts from the battlefield; 
" 1 ,200 dead" cannot equal the impact of a single image showing a landscape littered with 
corpses that extend out of the frame ad infinitum. Yet Fenton' s work in particular also 
marks another first: Britain sent him specifically to provide images leading to a "more 
positive impression of the increasingly unpopular war" (Sontag 2003:48). In this way, 
the government began its involvement in and control of wartime images. 
Although governments have used photography for propaganda almost since its 
invention, the first blatant censorship of wartime images happened during World War I 
(Sontag 2003:64), as I mentioned in the previous chapter, when only a select few German 
and French photographers were allowed near the front lines. As the profession of 
military journalism grew, more and more reporters traveled to the front, and their images 
and reports became more stark. During Vietnam, for instance, reporters would often 
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roam relatively freely throughout war zones, and as a result coverage of that war was 
especially grisly. But by 1991, with the advent of the first Gulf War, the military had 
dramatically altered its wartime journalism policy. Instead of free-ranging reporters, the 
military created press pools from which it would choose a representative to travel with 
the military on selected, carefully-controlled battlefield tours, so as not to show the true 
effects of war and suffering to families back home (Gusterson 2004:80). 
During this same period, war coverage underwent another paradigm shift, in that 
the media chose to focus on the waging of war rather than on the effects of war. As a 
result of this change, combat became entertainment. Resembling a video game more than 
reality, coverage from this period, filmed at a safe distance, shows the night skies ablaze 
with tracer rounds and explosions. Reporters gave little if any attention to the results of 
the battles. Major news outlets refused, for instance, to air footage showing the carpet 
bombing and mass killings of Iraqi conscripts leaving Kuwait on the road to Basra, Iraq 
(Sontag 2003:66). In any case, censorship, whether voluntary or mandated, remains alive 
and well in the modem media. Photographs of coffins returning from Iraq are banned for 
fear of instilling negative feelings in viewers ( or indeed, in potential recruits and their 
families), a topic which I cover later in this chapter in greater detail. Governments, after 
all, have very little to gain from reminding the general populace that participants in war 
actually die. 
When the dead are shown, strict yet unwritten rules govern what is appropriate. 
Pictures of fallen soldiers from the Civil War are still powerful, perhaps because many 
show the faces of those killed; young boys and men with blank stares gaze into the 
camera. No further images of war casualties were printed for eighty years, until Life (in 
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September 1943) published George Strock's "Dead Gis on Buna Beach" showing three 
soldiers killed after a landing in New Guinea (Sontag 2003 :70). But this image was the 
first- to conform to the new cardinal rule of publishing pictures of the dead: the faces of 
the soldiers must be invisible. From D-Day onward, images of soldiers killed in action 
graced the pages of several publications, provided that the dead were, indeed, 
anonymous. This same rule does not apply, however, when a publication shows footage 
or images of foreign dead. Nor does the rule apply, especially in America, when the 
violence is represented as entertainment, as it often does in movies, on television, or in 
video games. In these venues, the prevailing trend has long been that the larger and more 
graphic the body count, the better the product sells.6 
In fact, Susan Sontag (2003 :70) notes that the "more remote or exotic the place, 
the more likely we are to have full frontal views of the dead and dying." This reflects the 
continuing fascination people have with the "exotic other," that somehow, the dignity we 
afford our own is not granted to those unlike us. Sontag (2003 :71) uses the example of 
post-colonial Africa, which she argues exists in public consciousness as a string of very 
personal images documenting one horror after another, from famine to genocide to HIV. 
According to her, such images serve a dual purpose. First, they do indeed show tragedies 
that should be stopped or alleviated. But second, they also reaffirm the understanding 
that these very tragedies - starving children, atrocious wars, devastating diseases - are 
par for the course in this region of the world. Another implication might be that strong 
6 Some media outlets, and especially Hollywood, have produced works that do demonstrate the violence 
and futility of war and its effects on veterans, civilians, and so forth . Notable examples from popular film 
include Platoon, Apocalypse Now, The Deer Hunter, Full Metal Jacket, Born on the Fourth of July, and 
First Blood. These remain, however, exceptions to the rule and have had little permanent impact on social 
or political policy. 
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national leadership, a powerful central government, and a robust military are all 
necessary to prevent similar tragedies from affecting the homefront. 
This brief account illustrates two important points about images from conflicts. 
The first is that images can and do serve multiple and often contradictory purposes, 
whether intended or not. Visual representations of war, death, and destruction do not 
create feelings only of repulsion. At the same time, an image that for one person clearly 
illustrates the futility and wastefulness of war can stir greater militancy or calls for 
revenge from another, who sees the image as reinforcing the perceived justness of the 
struggle. Consider the simple example of a dead American soldier in Iraq. Pacifists may 
react to the image in horror and dismay: here lies yet another wasted life, the cost of too 
little diplomacy and too liberal use of military force. Hawks, on the other hand, might 
argue that this clearly demonstrates why America must continue its war against terrorism: 
because people exist who are willing to kill those who want to spread democracy and 
freedom. A militant Islamic fundamentalist might celebrate, seeing in the image proof 
positive that Allah has blessed his cause and smote the infidel invader. Of course, these 
are caricatures of attitudes, but they show how a single, simple image can stir different 
emotions among disparate groups. 
Indeed, a single image can become a tool for very different ends depending on 
who is using it, and old images can become new again with a bit of polish and 
propaganda. Susan Sontag writes that the images of "wretched hollow-eyed Gis that 
once seemed subversive of militarism and imperialism may seem inspirational. Their 
revised subject: ordinary American young men doing their unpleasant, ennobling duty" 
(2003: 38). Images and videos of conflicts, then, convey different meanings to at least 
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two "sides," the "victims" and the "aggressors," and in reality probably contain 
significant and different meanings to others outside those two immediate groups as well. 
Any time the media broadcast or print various images, by necessity they must make a 
judgment as to which "meaning" they will emphasize and report. In the absence of first­
hand knowledge and experience, people generally rely on the media to present unbiased 
information from which they can form their own opinions, at least in theory. 
The second point is that America is one of few countries that have led a relatively 
peaceful existence within their own borders. Allied neighbors and vast oceans have 
isolated America from significant violence other than the Civil War. These 
circumstances mean that except for soldiers and military personnel who have actually 
been involved in combat operations, very few Americans have witnessed large-scale 
organized violence. I discuss this point at greater length later. Most people in the United 
States, then, rely almost entirely on the media for coverage of global conflict. They are, 
perhaps, less likely to question the images presented to them by the media: they are also 
less likely to relate to the horrors shown in the pictures or reports. 
This section has covered, albeit rather briefly, the history of the censorship and 
manipulation of images, specifically those dealing with the dead or dying. The best 
examples, however, of how those in power can literally create realities of war and 
violence that are perhaps, at least at first blush, counter-intuitive are found in print and 
broadcast media. This is because, more than anything else, language has the ability to 
influence reality and is therefore a primary tool of the powerful to reinforce and to sell 
their agenda. 
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Language and Power 
The power of any democratic state requires the consent of the masses; that is, the 
people, in a very real sense, "allow" themselves to be governed by granting that power to 
others (for an excellent background to these ideas, see Fairclough 1989). Typically, this 
popular support is attained through discourse, wherein a constant negotiation takes place 
between those in power and those without. As part of this ongoing negotiation, the elite 
will use discourse that consistently reinforces its own position. For example, the ruling 
class may employ language that reinforces existing social structures and boundaries. 
If the powerful are to place themselves firmly at the head of the well-governed 
group, first they must create a bond amongst the masses. They must, in other words, 
create a sense of solidarity in the group so that they act as a willing collective that is, in 
many ways, a single entity. This can be accomplished by playing up all the 
commonalities that citizens of a state share, such as language, ethnicity, patriotic notions, 
and so forth. These qualities are virtually identical to the ones that Anderson ( 1991) 
shows create "imagined communities," in which people who generally do not know one 
another all share a deep sense of common identity and closeness. 
Implicit in the notion that the powerful create solidarity to unite disparate groups 
into a single body is the idea that they then set that unity against a different or exotic 
"other." This is usually done to "sell" ideas to the people and is critically important when 
considering warfare. The concept of the united group standing in unwavering support of 
an elite band of leaders allows the use of terms such as "we," "us," and "our," which are 
then set against some incarnation of "them" and "they." When these "us" vs. "them" 
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comparisons are made, however, they frequently contain abstract, ideological imagery 
that serves a dual purpose. 
First, it is more difficult to protest ideologies, such as "freedom" or "democracy." 
The elite often couch their discourse in such terms, then, especially when justifying their 
actions such as war. It is inadvisable, for instance, to say something like, "We are going 
to war to secure access to oil." When said in that way, people can make a judgment 
against fighting for resources and consider whether the potential deaths of soldiers are 
worth it. Instead, however, the argument might go more like this: "We must ensure that 
freedom and democracy flourish throughout the world and are not stomped out by the 
boot of absolutism and tyranny." This language is less problematic for the state, because 
fewer people would argue that ideas such as "freedom" and "democracy" are bad or that 
"absolutism" and "tyranny" should be allowed to persist. Interestingly, as the next 
section will discuss, a person's thoughts about abstract concepts like these are rather 
susceptible to the language used to describe them. 
Another way that the powerful use language to cement their position of 
dominance is through the use of complex language that is often difficult for the average 
person to understand. As I have discussed, a specialized language or vocabulary goes a 
long way towards defining a veritable sacred space that affords access only to a select 
group. Often, bureaucratic language is recondite (see, e.g. , Charrow 1982; Redish 1983; 
Sarangi and Slembrouck 1 996). One advantage of this to those in power is that complex, 
difficult language helps to stave off closer inspection by the masses. Additionally, 
however, it reinforces the notion that those in power should be there if they can 
understand such language; in other words, convoluted, jargon-filled language that is so 
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often a part of official state discourse forms a major part of the barrier between the upper 
echelon of power and "regular" citizens (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2001; Fairclough 
2002). 
This exchange between the powerful and their followers is not restricted to words. 
Visual images are also part of the discourse (Fairclough 1989: see esp. ch. 2). As I 
mentioned above, most images of violence and warfare are alien to the experiences of the 
average citizen ( or at least of the middle and upper-class citizens). The horrors they 
show, then, are indeed more abstract than real. As such, the elite can manipulate their 
meanings through carefully-crafted commentary just as if they were words in a script and 
in doing so present a "reality" that is more in line with their goals. The next section will 
explore these issues further through an examination of how the powerful use language to 
describe war, and especially how this language contributes significantly to the 
disappearing body. 
The Language of War 
George Orwell ( 1946) had this to say in "Politics and the English Language" 
regarding the potency of the spoken word: "But if thought corrupts language, language 
can also corrupt thought." What Orwell was suggesting ( setting aside his notion of 
"corruption") - that language does not so much reflect the world as shape it - is a concise 
summation of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. The basic premise of this hypothesis is that 
insofar as languages differ in how they represent ideas such as time and space, so too will 
the speakers of those languages actually conceptualize the world uniquely (for a 
collection of Whorfs writings on this, see Carroll 1956). As a simple example, native 
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Mandarin Chinese speakers refer to time differently than native English speakers, and as 
such each group "sees" the world in a completely different way than the other 
(Boroditsky 2001 ). 
Put another way, the words people use and hear form part of a boundary that 
defines the very extent of their thoughts. Orwell understood that people in power can 
literally create reality and truth with nothing more than carefully-selected vocabulary. 
Whether or not he ever believed such a force could be employed to a positive end, he 
certainly envisioned darker applications, a view he memorably put forth in 1984, with its 
concepts of "Newspeak," "doublethink," and the "Thought Police." In his dystopic 
world, thought, language, and reality were all one in the same. Wielded adroitly, then, 
language becomes one of the key tools that those in control of information can use to 
influence society's understanding of that information. 
As the primary means by which humans process the world around them, 
language, whether spoken or written, commands great power. This power has been 
recognized since the earliest of times, and indeed the formal study of language and its 
ability to shape people's opinions developed in ancient Greece in the form of rhetoric. 
Part of the reason language is so effective in influencing opinions, and even in crafting 
the basic archetypes that form the foundations of human thought, could relate to the 
fundamental makeup of the brain itself. 
In this discussion, it is critical to understand that humans are an essentializing 
species; that is, we categorize the world constantly, breaking components down by their 
essential characteristics (see, e.g., Lakoff 1987). As a result of this process, every 
individual places things, people, ideas, and so on into various mental "buckets" of 
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similarity. Putting something into a virtual bucket allows a person to assign attributes 
and emotions to new items and experiences quickly and efficiently, as this facilitates 
rapid comparison of the new item with all other existing groups. Virtually all 
categorization is automatic and happens at the unconscious level. As Lakoff (1987:5) 
notes, there is "nothing more basic than categorization to our thought, perception, action, 
and speech."  
Lakoff goes on to argue that categorization is  a process involving both human 
experience and individual imagination. He notes, for example, that one's culture and 
personal mental imagery have a direct impact on how that person views the world. 
Consistent reinforcement of particular images describing a certain class or group ( for 
example, "our enemies are inhuman, godless, and immoral") can therefore lead to 
automatic and unconscious attribution of these qualities in the future. Michael Agar 
( 1994) suggests that culture molds language into a comfortable virtual room in which 
each person operates. Extending his argument, the longer a person remams m a 
comfortable space, one defined by a familiar language, the process of pulling that 
individual out of his or her room and introducing the person to a new space (i.e., to a 
different vocabulary and dissimilar ideas) becomes increasingly difficult. Interestingly, 
research has shown (e.g., Boroditsky 2001; Gentner and Boroditsky 2001) that language 
has the most powerful impact on thought when the concept is abstract and less reliant on 
sensory information. Concepts such as "enemies" and "warfare" are, for most people, 
especially those in W estem developed nations, rather abstract. This means that the 
language that states use to describe and report on such topics likely goes a long way 
towards shaping the opinions of the masses. 
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Lakoffs position is quite similar to Scott's (1990:10) notion of how the repetitive 
performance of a particular public transcript will, over time, legitimize the performance 
and make it the "normal state" of the subordinate actor, as discussed in the preceding 
chapter. The ways in which the armed forces and the government describe warfare and 
its results illustrates this well. The military often uses specific phrases and words to 
describe the enemy, especially as part of press briefings or similar reports. As the 
numerous examples in the following section will show, this language often attempts to 
abstract and dehumanize enemy combatants. In this world of linguistic legerdemain, 
enemies are not so much destroyed as deleted or moved aside, much as one would 
casually swat a fly or throw away a piece of trash. Over time, and with enough repetition 
and reinforcement from the media and the military, average citizens (and even soldiers) 
perhaps come to conceptualize any military opponent as subhuman and somehow lesser. 
When this happens, the names, faces, and stories of enemy soldiers, foreign civilians, and 
anyone else caught in the crossfire vanish and are rarely given a second thought. The 
language used crafts the audience's understanding of who is right, who is wrong, and 
even who is human. 
Dehumanization of the enemy is useful for another reason. Killing is an unnatural 
act for virtually all humans. Studies have shown, for instance, that in combat many 
soldiers refuse to fire their weapons, or they purposely miss their targets ( Grossman 
1995). Throughout history, societies have used various methods to counteract this basic 
human aversion to killing, but by far the most common is some type of a ritual designed 
to transform a citizen into a soldier (Ehrenreich 1997: see esp. ch. 1 ). During these 
rituals, the warrior leaves his daily life and enters a mental world where killing is socially 
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acceptable and necessary. In modern Western societies, the ritual is usually boot camp, 
where enlistees first assume the role of a soldier and are, in theory at least, trained not 
just how to kill, but how to become killers. Part of the consistent reinforcement that 
allows this transformation to take place is the understanding that the enemy is not human. 
Such a mindset makes it easier to kill another human, which is normally a repulsive and 
difficult act. Furthermore, the brotherhood of the soldier is strong, and many people in 
the military feel a deep bond with all other soldiers. This connection not only extends 
through time, where modern soldiers are somehow linked with the warriors of the ancient 
world, but also to all modern soldiers, including the enemy (Ehrenreich 1997:139-142). 
If an opponent fights well and honorably, Ehrenreich argues, then that enemy is worthy 
of respect. But if the enemies are less than human, then it is less likely that soldiers will 
consider them as equals and therefore worthy of inclusion into the universal warrior 
brotherhood. 
In addition to the choice of words used to describe enemy combatants, the 
language employed to speak about war in general deserves some attention. A call to arms 
is often synonymous with ideas of "sacrifice." Dead soldiers are said to have made "the 
ultimate sacrifice," or to have "offered their lives" for a higher and nobler cause, for 
instance. These ideas, according to Barbara Ehrenreich ( 1997), carry significant religious 
undertones and allude to a sacralization of war that is almost a cultural universal.7 The 
modem notion of "sacrifice," she argues, conveys a bloodless, passive emotion 
essentially synonymous with "self-denial and renunciation." She shows ( 1997 :23) that 
7 For a much longer discussion of how warfare is a religion of the state, see the preceeding chapter. I 
reintroduce the idea here since this is a closer treatment of the language employed to support such a notion. 
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historically, however, "sacrifice" almost always involved public bloodshed, killing, 
torture, or mutilation, and was also closely tied to religion. 
This section has attempted to show the links between language and thought, and 
how language is regularly used to reinforce ideas and literally create reality. What 
follows is, as I mentioned before, the heart of this work: examples of how, in various 
contexts, those in power make bodies symbolically disappear from reports, briefings, 
stories, and so forth in an effort to help to maintain their hegemonic lock as members of 
the elite. As such, atrocities are downplayed, body counts are rarely provided, civilians 
are virtually absent from the discourse; in short, the whole truth is distinctly missing, and 
much of the reporting could perhaps be described as "lies of omission." 
Examples and Consequences of Body-Free Reporting 
As Catherine Lutz (2001 :2) remarks, one of most common effects of censorship, 
restrictions, and altered reporting by the media is that most ordinary people, including 
those within the military, have been inculcated to view the aims of wars in very general, 
abstract terms, such as "ending terrorism," "ensuring freedom and democracy," and 
"defense." But, she continues, this kind of thinking causes people to miss the "melted, 
exploded, raped, and lacerated bodies and destroyed social world at [war's] center," 
consequences which are almost universally the result of conflict and violence. 
More important, however, is that these very corpses, the shattered remains of the 
enemy, are often the goal of war (whether explicit or implicit), insofar as wars generally 
require combat as a means towards victory, and combat in turn requires killing. Yet, 
military leaders often have a way of hiding this fact behind the veil of seemingly absurd 
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statements. During the First Gulf War, for instance, General Norman Schwarzkopf was 
asked about Iraqi casualties, to which he responded: "We are not in the business of 
killing" (Gusterson 2004:74). Similarly, President Bush's national security advisor at the 
time, Brent Scowcroft, told news anchor Sam Donaldson that "our goal was not to kill 
people. Our goal was to destroy the Iraqi army" (Gusterson 2004:74). This indicates that 
winning a war or the destruction of an army can somehow happen outside the reality of 
killing. 8 Furthermore, military and government leaders have the ability to shift the focus 
of a war onto a single enemy. For example, the 1 99 1  Gulf War was a "war against 
Saddam," and American soldiers were "bombing Saddam," when in reality they were 
attacking his soldiers and infrastructure (Gusterson 2004:74). Personalizing a conflict in 
this way further obfuscates the underlying human cost. Although these statements 
perhaps seem ridiculous here in a vacuum, very few people likely would question these 
statements in the context of official reporting because the military and the media have 
constructed a hegemonic system of power and authority that most citizens of the nation­
state simply accept. When military discourse is examined, the startling truth is that such 
examples are not isolated; indeed, these merely reflect the standard message doled out to 
the people whenever news of military operations is related. 
Staying with the Gulf War of 1 991, we find that reporting of the conflict 
consistently abstracted or obscured reports of human death. Gusterson (2004:73-75) 
provides several examples: prominent among these is General Schwarzkopf s refusal to 
8 
The statements of Scowcroft and the others may not actually be as paradoxical as they seem, since 
presumably America would have accepted the "destruction" of the Iraqi army if it had, e.g., completely 
surrendered and disbanded without any resistance or casualties. So while the goal certainly may not have 
been necessarily to kill people, these statements were made knowing that combat, and therefore killing, was 
indeed required to effect the desired destruction. 
49 
estimate Iraqi dead during his final briefing, although the lack of an official body count 
had been military policy since the Vietnam War (Graham 2005). American leaders and 
military spokespeople would constantly find euphemisms for "kill" in relation to human 
deaths, but had no trouble using "kill" when describing the destructions of tanks, artillery, 
missile installations, etc. Dead civilians were lumped under the term "collateral 
damage," while dead enemy combatants were labeled "forces," "units," "assets," or 
"targets." Operations meant to destroy such troops were described as "softening up," 
"giving attention to," "attriting," or even "pounding." Sometimes the military even 
resorts to language that reduces killing to a game. The killing of Iraqi forces retreating 
north from Kuwait mentioned earlier was described as, by one American officer, a 
"turkey shoot" (Sontag 2003 :66). Of course, within these enemy tanks, or stationed at 
these missile installations or artillery positions, are human beings. And most assuredly, 
when a Maverick missile fired from an A-10 Thunderbolt "Tank Killer" aircraft slams 
into the tank in an effort to "soften up" the enemy line, those humans are ripped apart and 
utterly broken by fire and flying metal. 
The United States also has a history of restricting the reporting by other countries 
of the effects of war. One good example of this is the restriction of Japanese media and 
scientific coverage of the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Shortly after the 
bombings, Hatoyama Ichiro, a leading Japanese politician and future prime minister, 
wrote about the seeming incompatibility between the United States's actions and 
international law. He charged, in a September 15, 1945 newspaper article in the Asahi, 
that the use of atomic weapons and the killing of innocent people was both a violation of 
international law and a war crime. The Occupation forces suspended publication of the 
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paper for 48 hours under the recently imposed Press Code, which the forces used to 
restrict ultra-nationalist ideology and criticism of the United States (Hook 1988:141). 
Another leading Japanese news agency was suspended for 24 hours for reporting that the 
atomic bomb was a weapon "too terrible to face and one which only barbarians would 
use" (Braw 1986:97). 
Following the immediate aftermath of the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the 
Press Code continued to be used to limit the reporting of damage from the atomic bombs, 
especially when the reports referred to the effects of the bombs on humans. Hook 
(1988:147-148) notes not only that information was directly censored, but that the Press 
Code created an environment of self-censorship in which reporting of the lingering 
effects of the bomb completely disappeared. Furthermore, Japanese scientists were eager 
to publish materials and papers discussing the medical and scientific impacts of nuclear 
weapons (Braw 1986:113). Occupation authorities, however, prevented the vast majority 
from being published until January 1949, fully three years after the attacks (Hook 
1 988: 150). This censorship of material aimed at both public (newspapers, popular 
literature) and professional (scientific and medical reports) audiences diminished the 
understanding of the physiological and psychological effects of nuclear war and is an 
excellent example of America's history of media censorship of information relating to 
bodies in military contexts. 
While America may have a history of censoring or altering information about 
war, some of its opponents have been significantly more forthright. The official Iraqi line 
on the 1991 Gulf War, for instance, was significantly different from America's. 
Gusterson (2004:75) discusses this contrast, noting that before the outbreak of fighting 
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Saddam plainly stated his intention to kill as many Americans as he could. Radio reports 
in Baghdad said that U.S. soldiers were "swimming" and "wading" in their own blood, 
and that Saddam and the Iraqis would send the soldiers back home to their families as 
"lifeless corpses." This kind of rhetoric certainly does not make bodies vanish, and this 
imagery has an interesting side effect. Although far fewer Americans died than Iraqis, 
American coverage of these broadcasts consistently made Saddam and Iraq appear to be 
much more violent than the U.S. military. 
American dead during this campaign could not escape abstraction through 
language, either. The First Gulf War was America's first major military operation since 
Vietnam, and the reporting of deaths had changed dramatically during the intervening 
years. In Vietnam, images of dead soldiers being loaded onto helicopters off the 
battlefields were a common sight on the evening news for almost a decade. By 1991, 
however, the soldiers were not even "bodies," but rather they became "human remains" 
shipped home in "human remains pouches," not "body bags" (Gusterson 2004:74). It 
was at this time that the Department of Defense banned media coverage of returning war 
dead. 
Although many of the examples used so far have been American, this type of 
reporting certainly happens in other places. Carolyn Nordstrom (2004: see esp. 25-39) 
writes about all manner of people and activities that go undetected or unreported during 
times of war throughout the world. For example, she discusses the 1983 Sri Lanka riots 
and the media coverage they received. She writes about a spontaneous riot in a train 
station where all manner of people began attacking Tamils; later, the paper would say 
that the riot was "organized," and that people with voter lists were "systematically" 
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attacking Tamils. Nordstrom was surprised at the inaccuracy of the accounts and at how 
the "youth, the women, the elders, the children disappeared from the accounts," replaced 
by explanations that focused on "adult men." None of the accounts was exactly wrong, 
she writes, but they were often underreported or only told half-truths. Her experiences 
led her to conclude that the daily truths about violence and conflict are erased, only to be 
replaced by watered-down accounts that become the accepted truth. Anyone's life, it 
should be noted, from the powerful to the entirely weak, is subject to erasure when the 
reality does not fit within an accepted myth. The unfortunate. fact is that the media have a 
great ability to craft "truth" and "reality" using carefully-chosen words and images, 
which is disturbingly close to the fiction of George Orwell' s  1984, in which the sole news 
agency would, based on the current geopolitical situation, revise past stories at will that 
then immediately became the official accounts. 
The Nebulous Nature of War and its Boundaries 
Another major roadblock to accurate reporting is that media outlets and military 
spokespeople tend to define a conflict as the expanse of time between a more-or-less 
formal declaration of war and a more-or-less formal peace declaration or cessation of 
hostilities. Here, then, is another area where language can have profound impacts on the 
public perception of military operations. In America, the only formal declarations of war 
have been the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, the Spanish-American War, 
World War I, and World War II. All additional conflicts, including Vietnam, Panama, 
and the current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, are simply extended military 
engagements authorized by Congress as "interventions," "restorations," "operations," or 
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"conflicts." Yet many are labeled as a "war," such as the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf 
War, and the War on Terror, by the military, politicians, and in the popular media. 
Congress has consistently granted to the President great leeway in using force and 
deploying troops for extended periods of time without an official declaration of war. 
Defining the boundaries between when "war" begins and when it ends, then, is often 
rather difficult, since formal peace or victory requirements may be lacking ( or may be 
unclear) and may, for example, be at the discretion of the head of a given nation-state. 
Increasingly, non-state actors, such as terrorist groups not linked to a specific 
government, or paramilitary organizations, wage their own private wars without regard 
for borders or official control.9 
The reality is that conflicts, or the results of them, often live on long after the 
various sides have ceased firing and peace processes, if any, are set into motion. The 
dreadful legacy of Agent Orange and its use in Vietnam is a good example. A journalist 
for the BBC (Fawthrop 2004) wrote an interesting piece highlighting several of the issues 
related to the lingering impacts of Agent Orange, both in Vietnam and on returning 
soldiers. According to the article, millions of gallons of the defoliant were used 
throughout Vietnam, primarily from 1962-1970 (see, e.g., Stellman, et al. 2003). The 
active ingredient in Agent Orange is dioxin, a highly toxic chemical. Although it did 
work as a defoliant, the dioxin then entered the environment of Vietnam, in particular the 
soil and water sources. Professor Nguyen Trong Nhan, the former president of the 
Vietnamese Red Cross, attests that as many as 150,000 children have been born with 
9 For an interesting discussion on the elasticity of borders, allegiances, and leadership in war, and of the 
degree to which nation-states participate in war, see Nordstrom (2004), especially chapter 4. 
54 
birth defects since 1975 that he conjectures can be traced back to the parents' exposure to 
dioxin from Agent Orange, and health studies have confirmed that link (see, e.g., Ngo, et 
al. 2006). In addition, the article claims that about three million people in all were 
exposed to the chemical, and that one million of these individuals have suffered health 
problems as a result. Even as recently as 2001, a marked elevation of dioxin was found 
in blood samples in 19 out of 20 people living in a southern Vietnamese city (Schecter, et 
al. 2001 ). Fawthorp also notes that testing done on soil next to a Vietnamese military 
base where Agent Orange was stored in large quantities shows that it contains dioxin 
levels 180 million times the safe level set by the Environmental Protection Agency. 
Professor Nguyen Trong Nhan argues (Fawthrop 2004) that the use of such a substance is 
"a massive violation of human rights of the civilian population, and a weapon of mass 
destruction" in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical and 
biological agents. The Fawthorp article further states that Washington has consistently 
denied any moral or legal responsibility for deaths or health problems associated with 
Agent Orange, although Dow Chemical and the government have settled with veterans. 1 0 
In a similar situation, survivors of the atomic bombs used against Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki continue to show higher occurrences of cancers ( especially leukemia) and 
psychological trauma, and higher rates of other mental and physical defects are present in 
their children (see, e.g., Lifton 1967; Nakashima 1994; Otake, et al. 1991; Oughterson 
1 0 There was a class action lawsuit that ordered payments to be made to veterans, but the fund closed in 
1 997. Incidentally, the average payout to a veteran from this suit was $3,800. Other veterans have since 
sued, claiming that those who became ill after the first judgment have not had their day in court. For more 
information on the second set of litigation, see information related to Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson. 
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and Warren 1956; Yoshimoto 1995). These deaths and physical ailments are precisely 
what vanish, or at best are relegated to academia, largely marginalized and forgotten. 
The long-term effects of many chemicals, agents, and munitions used during 
combat have been poorly studied, so it is difficult to estimate the environmental, medical, 
and social impacts they will have over time. What is startling, however, is that the use of 
such harmful agents has not been limited to combat zones, nor have the targets always 
been hostile. After World War II, for instance, American scientists frequently 
experimented with hazardous radioactive substances not only on soldiers, but also on 
civilians. For instance, servicemen were marched into atomic mushroom clouds to 
measure their physiological and psychological reactions, while radioactive substances, 
such as plutonium, were sprinkled on the breakfast cereals of groups of test subjects, 
including patients who were poor, incarcerated, or mentally disabled (see, e.g., Gallagher 
1993; Rosenberg 1980; Welsome 2000). In another example, project leaders were 
concerned that fallout from nuclear testing in Nevada might drift downwind, sailing over 
populated areas, and it did indeed (traveling over 100 miles), but they ultimately rejected 
evacuating the affected areas (Mitchell 1994 ). The stories of these people, and the 
medical and psychological trauma they have endured, are mostly forgotten or ignored by 
the mainstream press and the general population. 
Number Crunching: Counting and Discounting the Human Cost 
Casting aside the rhetoric that is clearly used to hide accurate and realistic 
representation of dead bodies and the true goals of war, what remains is the disturbing 
reality of the sheer number of deaths that rarely see the light of day ( or enter the lens of 
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the camera, or reach the ears of citizens). For example, the website IraqBodyCount.net 
states that as of April 17, 2006, a minimum of 34,493 civilians have been killed as a 
result of military operations in Iraq since 2003 as part of the War on Terror, and the site 
states a maximum number of 38,641. 1 1  Here is what the site says about how it derives its 
numbers: 
Casualty figures are derived solely from a comprehensive survey of online 
media reports. Where these sources report differing figures, the range ( a 
minimum and a maximum) are given. All results are independently 
reviewed and error-checked by at least three members of the Iraq Body 
Count project team before publication. 
The selection of sources is impressive, with almost one hundred mentioned, and every 
single account is listed, containing the date, time, location, target (i.e., who died, such as 
"policeman," "house hit," "construction workers," etc.), weapon( s) used, the reported 
minimum and maximum dead, and at least two media sources. Because of the size of the 
campaign and the inability to report every death, the actual number killed is likely to be 
greater. Gusterson (2004:72), citing newspaper reports, notes that the first Gulf War is 
now thought to have taken 200,000 Iraqi lives as a result of both the fighting and 
sanctions, which is the same total number killed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Noam 
Chomsky (2002:36) points out that based on results from a study, Americans, on average, 
believe that there were about 100,000 Vietnamese casualties during Vietnam. The 
1 1  
Assuming a span of three years and the minimum number dead, that works out to almost 32 civilians 
killed every day in Iraq alone. And these figures only represent the deaths that are covered by various 
media and posted online, so the actual number is likely higher. 
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"official" figure, he notes, 1s roughly 2,000,000, and the actual number 1s likely 
3,000,000-4,000,000. 12 
Despite these numbers, few media outlets report stories related primarily to 
civilian deaths, or they are buried inside a larger story; rarely are there pictures of the 
dead, and even more infrequently does anyone ask why these non-combatants died. In 
fact, here is the text of a leaked memo that was circulated at the Panama (Fl.) City News 
Herald specifically requesting that news related to civilian deaths be altered or buried 
because of negative public reaction: 
DO NOT USE photos on Page l A  showing civilian casualties from the 
U.S. war on Afghanistan. Our sister paper in Fort Walton Beach has done 
so and received hundreds and hundreds of threatening e-mails and the 
like .... DO NOT USE wire stories which lead with civilian casualties from 
the U.S. war on Afghanistan. They should be mentioned further down in 
the story. If the story needs rewriting to play down the civilian casualties, 
DO IT. The only exception is if the U.S. hits an orphanage, school or 
similar facility and kills scores or hundreds of children. (Fairness & 
Accuracy in Reporting 2001 b) 
In a similar decision shortly after 9/11, CNN chair Walter Isaacson instructed his staff to 
balance images of civilian deaths caused by American operations in Afghan cities with 
constant reminders that the Taliban is actually responsible for the deaths as a result of 
their terrorist actions, not the United States, noting that he did not want CNN used as a 
"propaganda platform" (Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting 200 l a). 13 A follow-up memo 
12 Chomsky also notes that the study asked (and left unanswered) the following question: What would the 
world think of Germany and its political culture if its population estimated that only 300,000 Jews died in 
the Holocaust? Therefore, what does such a response about Vietnam say about U.S. leadership, education, 
and culture in general? 
13 An interesting statement, since his decision not to air such footage, as well as to use carefully-crafted 
language in an effort to shift the blame for foreign civilian deaths onto the enemy, could be seen as pro­
America propaganda. 
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from Rick Davis, CNN' s head of standards and practices, provided sample language that 
should be used on-air when addressing civilian destruction: 
"We must keep in mind, after seeing reports like this from Taliban­
controlled areas, that these U.S. military actions are in response to a 
terrorist attack that killed close to 5,000 innocent people in the U.S." or, 
"We must keep in mind, after seeing reports like this, that the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan continues to harbor terrorists who have praised the 
September 11 attacks that killed close to 5,000 innocent people in the 
U.S.," or "The Pentagon has repeatedly stressed that it is trying to 
minimize civilian casualties in Afghanistan, even as the Taliban regime 
continues to harbor terrorists who are connected to the September 11 
attacks that claimed thousands of innocent lives in the U.S.". (Fairness & 
Accuracy in Reporting 2001a) 
It should be noted, in light of the seeming need to refer to the 9/11 dead as justification 
for civilian deaths in the War on Terror, that by the close of 2001, American military 
personnel had killed more people than had perished on that September day (Shor 2002). 
Indeed, many people in power explicitly do believe that civilian deaths are part 
and parcel of the business of war. Famously, for instance, Madeleine Albright, former 
Secretary of State, has been quoted as saying on "60 Minutes" ( 5/ 12/96) that the deaths of 
500,000 Iraqi children under the age of 5 as a result of imposed sanctions were a price 
worth paying. 14 Similarly, a panel of journalists on Fox News Channel's "Special Report 
with Brit Hume" (11/5/01) agreed that civilian casualties simply "accompany war" and 
are "unavoidable," and as such do not deserve special news coverage (Fairness & 
Accuracy in Reporting 2001 b ). In fact, CNN anchor Daryn Kagan interviewed Al 
14 For a more complete discussion of this comment, see http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1 084. The 
discussion, among other things, staties that only one mention of the quote appears in major news sources 
since 9/1 1 ,  and that Bin Laden used images of lraqi babies "wasting away" as a result of the sanctions as 
justification for his actions. This is particularly interesting, because as the site notes: "The inference that 
Albright and the terrorists may have shared a common rationale--a belief that the deaths of thousands of 
innocents are a price worth paying to achieve one's political ends--does not seem to be one that can be 
made in U.S. mass media." 
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Jazeera's editor-in-chief, Ahmed Al-Sheik, asking whether stories showing dead civilians 
(especially in Fallujah), including young women and children, was appropriate and 
accurate (Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting 2004). Al-Sheik responded that yes, the 
stories were "accurate" and showed "what takes place on the ground," to which Kagan 
countered: 
Isn't the story, though, bigger than just the simple numbers, with all due 
respect to the Iraqi civilians who have lost their lives - the story bigger 
than just the numbers of people who were killed or the fact that they might 
have been killed by the U.S. military, that the insurgents, the people trying 
to cause problems within Fallujah, are mixing in among the civilians, 
making it actually possible that even more civilians would be killed, that 
the story is what the Iraqi insurgents are doing, in addition to what is the 
response from the U.S. military? 
This statement reiterates the media's position that the "enemy" is actually responsible for 
civilian deaths, in effect saying that U.S. forces will kill insurgents wherever they are, 
and if innocent bystanders are caught in the crossfire, it is simply a result of war. One 
senior military analyst even suggested that Iraqis watching reports showing civilian 
deaths should instead watch a "legitimate, authoritative, honest news station," and that 
any station showing civilians killed by Americans is not a "legitimate" news source but 
instead merely promotes "propaganda" and "lies" (Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting 
2004). 
Despite many modern political leaders decrying propaganda as something less 
than honorable, propaganda has in fact had a long history in the arsenal of many states. 
In America, for instance, the first modern large-scale government propaganda operation 
began in 1916, shortly after Woodrow Wilson was elected President. Wilson had 
campaigned on a platform of peace and non-involvement in World War I. Noam 
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Chomsky, however, argues that the Wilson administration was indeed pro-war and as 
such established the Creel Commission, which succeeded within six months "in turning a 
pacifist population into a hysterical, war-mongering population which wanted to destroy 
everything German, tear the Germans limb from limb, go to war and save the world" 
(2002:11-12). Also, following Vietnam, political leaders put forth significant effort in 
overcoming "Vietnam Syndrome," which Norman Podhoretz, an intellectual during the 
Reagan administration, defined as "the sticky inhibitions against the use of military 
force" on the part of the public (Chomsky 2002:33). The practice of government 
involvement in significant propaganda campaigns continues today. Interestingly, 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld recently admitted that America is losing the 
propaganda war regarding its operations as part of the War on Terror (BBC News 2006). 
He went on to suggest that America's most important battles would occur in �ewsrooms, 
and that the U.S. must fight enemy lies by employing a 24-hour propaganda machine or 
else risk a "dangerous deficiency." On the one hand, then, at least one senior official is 
condemning the use of propaganda by the enemy, whereas on the other the U.S. Secretary 
of Defense is calling for its use literally around the clock and claiming that it is crucial to 
the success of America's military campaign against terrorism. 
Perhaps most strikingly, several independent journalists have reported (Fairness & 
Accuracy in Reporting 2004) that American forces, as part of the War on Terror, opened 
fire "randomly on unarmed citizens" and attacked "clearly marked ambulances," not just 
with heavy artillery, but primarily with sniper fire, which requires carefully-chosen 
targets with no room for ambiguity. Despite these events, many W estem news agencies 
refuse to air such reports. This argument that civilian deaths are undeserving of coverage 
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because they are merely a fact of war could be extended. Dropping bombs, for example, 
is a part of war, so does that mean that news agencies should stop covering airstrikes 
(Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting 2001b)? Clearly, many media organizations from 
which citizens obtain the news are bending to social and political pressures and are 
choosing not to broadcast ( and indeed to openly question why or whether they should 
broadcast) news stories and footage of civilian deaths caused as a result of American 
military operations. These practices add to the degraded quality of information presented 
to the public and can create a false understanding of what exactly happens during 
wartime and, even worse, helps to reduce the accountability of the military for its role in 
the deaths and devastation by making such reports disappear or, at the least, attacking 
their validity. 
Demography of the Dead: Anyone but the Male Combatants 
So who is dying in these warzones? Sadly, the answer is that today roughly 90 
percent of all wartime casualties are noncombatants, about half of whom are children 
(Strada 1996; UNICEF 2005). This is compared with civilians accounting for about 15 
percent of all deaths during World War I and 65 percent of deaths during World War II 
(Strada 1996). According to UNICEF, over two million children have died as a result of 
armed conflict over just the last ten years, and at least six million have been permanently 
disabled or seriously injured (8,000-10,000 children alone are killed or maimed by 
landmines annually). 
Despite these horrific numbers, many of their stories never reach the outside 
world. One of the main reasons for this is that women, children, and the elderly often 
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comprise a major percentage of the civilian dead. This is an example of underreporting, 
which is another means of making bodies vanish from accounts of war and violence. In 
these cases, however, it is not just the dead who vanish. For example, the stories of 
women on active duty in war also disappear. In Vietnam, for instance, estimates range 
from about 7,500-11,000 of women who served "in country," and a total of about 
265,000 served throughout the world as part of the war effort (Palmer 1987). Although it 
is estimated that 67 American women died in Vietnam (59 civilians and 8 military), this 
total may be wrong due to poorer record keeping regarding women in particular, or 
poorer record keeping in areas where women tended to be stationed, such as field 
hospitals. In any event, 265,000 is a large number of stories that are, largely, as yet 
untold. 
Then the question shifts to why, exactly, these individuals are dying. One factor 
is the targeting of an enemy's infrastructure, such as power, bridges, major roadways, and 
other crucial means of transportation and survival. For example, Kenneth Rizer (2001) 
discusses the purposeful targeting of Iraqi electrical power facilities during Desert Storm 
and the resulting civilian medical catastrophe: 
While crippling Iraq's military command and control capability, 
destruction of these facilities shut down water purification and sewage 
treatment plants. As a result, epidemics of gastroenteritis, cholera, and 
typhoid broke out, leading to perhaps as many as 100,000 civilian deaths 
and a doubling of the infant mortality rate. 
Another report (Ascherio, et al. 1992) found that while military leaders had suggested 
during the· Gulf War that high-precision weapons could limit the damage to civilian 
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populations 1 5, the reality was that the casualties from more modern warfare extended far 
beyond the direct results of combat. International law is not particularly clear as to the 
status of attacks on infrastructure. Some argue that certain targets, such as power 
stations, bridges, highways, and railroads, can be used for both civilian and military 
purposes, and their targeting has generally been accepted if destroying them offers a 
definite military advantage at the time of the attack (Rivkin Jr. and Casey 2003). Yet, 
according to Rivkin Jr. and Casey, the rules governing attacks against infrastructure also 
state that civilian casualties or damage to civilian property as a result of the attacks "must 
not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be 
gained." Such a restriction allows for liberal interpretation of what can and cannot be 
attacked, since determining the long-term effects of a particular target's  destruction can 
be subjective and difficult to quantify. 
Furthermore, since the American military does not keep an official body count of 
civilian deaths, the accountability for long-term devastation of civilian health and ability 
for survival becomes easier to downplay, ignore, or otherwise make disappear. Although 
the military has seemingly unofficially revived the practice of providing body counts for 
enemy combatants as a metric of success, even defense specialists note that the "murky 
nature of the conflicts" makes it difficult to distinguish among "an insurgent, a criminal, 
or an innocent civilian" (Graham 2005). What is most disturbing about this statement is 
that if it is difficult to determine who the true enemy is among the dead, surely it was 
difficult to do so prior to the engagement when they were all still alive. And as the 
15 Jarecki (2006) documents that during the first few months of the War on Terror, of 30+ "precision" 
munitions dropped onto military objectives, not a single one hit its target. Instead, several actually struck 
residental areas and killed civilians. 
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Geneva Conventions clearly state, clear identification of the targets is of paramount 
importance. 
The Geneva Conventions themselves state that valid military targets "are those 
which make an effective contribution to military action and whose destruction, capture or 
neutralization offers a definite military advantage" (Protocol I, Art. 52, Sec. 2). 16 Also, if 
there is any doubt as to whether a specific target such as a place of worship, house, or 
school is being used for military purposes, then it is presumed not to be a legitimate 
target (Protocol I, Art. 52, Sec. 3), and combatants "must distinguish" between civilian 
and military objectives (Protocol I, Art. 48). Furthermore, "indiscriminate attacks" are 
prohibited, including those "where the expected incidental loss of civilian life or damage 
to civilian objects is excessive to the military advantage anticipated" (Protocol I, Art. 51 ,  
Sec. 4 and 5b ). Most important, however, is the directive that an attack "must be called 
off' if it becomes apparent that the objective is non-military or that the attack could cause 
"incidental loss of civilian life or damage to civilian objects" (Protocol I, Art. 57). One 
might suspect that an attack on a major power grid would indeed cause loss of life (i.e., 
power outages at hospitals, inability to run sewage and water treatment plants, etc.), but 
seemingly these issues are of little concern. Either that, or reports of infrastructure 
destruction and civilian deaths are suppressed, ignored, or altered by the mass media and 
the military, thus further reducing the culpability and visibility of such actions among the 
majority of the public. 
16 
The quotes relating to the contents of the Geneva Conventions are all taken from 
http://www.genevaconventions.org/, which provides a comprehensive topical summary of the conventions 
and l inks to the specific protocols, articles, and sections referenced in the summaries. 
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Despite all this effort to downplay, bury, or alter the truths about war, many 
reports that do surface represent deaths and casualties only in terms of raw numbers and 
similar data. One problem with this approach is that numbers are insufficiently evocative 
and thus easy to ignore or to skip over. Take the number 58,178. It occupies about half 
an inch on this piece of paper. But this number, which is the approximate number of 
American deaths during the Vietnam War, looks quite a bit different when turned into the 
actual list of names carved into a stone monument. When this happens, the number 
translates to almost 500 feet in length, and about 10 feet high in many sections. By most 
accounts, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial is quite moving and starkly disturbing, a dark 
granite promise to the fallen that we will never forget their collective "sacrifice." And if 
each name were instead replaced by an image of the person's lifeless, burned, bullet­
ridden, or broken body, the result would be perhaps too disturbing. The point is that 
numbers dull. They are on the far end of a continuum of possible ways to report and 
discuss the dead. Numbers are sanitary, clean, safe; they make names, people, faces, 
emotions, bodies, and reality disappear. 
America's Violent Peaceful Landscape 
America is indeed a peaceful nation, at least in the sense that no major armed 
conflict has occurred within its borders since the Civil War ended over 150 years ago. 
America's  neighbors are friendly, and two vast oceans separate and protect it from threats 
of large-scale invasion. Violence and warfare, then, are not the daily experience of most 
of its citizens. Most, but not all. Most people do indeed go throughout their entire lives 
without first-hand exposure to excessive violence and death. But most is certainly not all, 
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and people live in America for whom violence and struggle are part of the daily grind. 
This is especially true in poor urban areas, where marginalized and minority populations 
often rely on violence as a means for survival or as retaliation against systematic 
oppression and systems of power that have left little other means for effective recourse. 
The problem is that this subaltern experience is rarely explored by the mass 
media, an omission that can lead to explosive consequences. Whenever the media do 
focus on a story relating to a minority, such as the Rodney King beating, a common 
reaction is anger because so often the story reflects a reality that was ignored by the 
masses for a long time. With Rodney King, for instance, African-Americans as a group 
especially were infuriated because of the decades of unequal treatment, suspicion, and 
abuse they received from law enforcement (Berry 1992). Also, during hurricane Katrina, 
if minorities were collecting food and supplies from abandoned stores, at least some 
media outlets accused them of "looting," whereas whites doing the same thing were 
merely "trying to survive" (Pezzone 2005). Whatever else this may reveal, it does show 
very clearly the underlying cultural assumptions related to various social groups, and that 
such divisions continue to impact our lives. Even more recently, 14-day riots in Paris 
were the result of the accidental electrocution of Muslims Bouna Traore and Zyed Benna 
who were hiding from the police who, the boys feared, were trying to shoot them. It 
seems that in many parts of the world, wherever societies exist that have significant class 
divides, just under the surface boils resentment and anger by the marginalized 
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populations at the consistent treatment and ignoring of problems and violence that arise 
as a result of such divides. 17 
This reflects what was discussed in the preceding chapter, that those who see the 
problems firsthand are often marginalized and essentially (made) invisible. This situation 
is less common in other parts of the world where, unlike the U.S., violence is either a 
very real part of daily lives or is at least a more recent and shared memory among the 
population. Indeed, much of the world, including most of Africa, southeast Asia, a good 
part of Eastern Europe, and quite a bit of South and Central America fall into this 
unfortunate category. Over time, however, the memory of violence and conflict, once the 
fighting stops, tend to fade from public consciousness. People have a desire to forget 
atrocities and the horrors of war. In America, this mindset is even more prevalent 
because, as was discussed earlier, this nation has been conflict-free within its borders. 
And as long as people are separated from the harsh realities of life in a war zone, it 
becomes easier to ignore the plight of others or even to overlook the truth that terrible, 
violent things happen during the execution of most military actions. Susan Sontag 
(2003: 100-101) notes that as long as people feel safe, they can and often will remain 
indifferent to images of suffering that are perceived as being far off or remote. Fear, she 
adds, can also cause individuals to ignore terrible images, for while most people readily 
watch horrific violence all the time in movies or on television without much reaction, a 
real-life image is a reminder that awful violence can and does happen. Living with a 
17 This point was eloquently expressed by a main character from the movie Boyz n the Hood, who noted 
that while watching a program discussing violence throughout the world, America was absent, leaving him 
confused as to whether the media were unaware of, unconcerned with, or simply self-censoring the 
violence he lived with each day. 
68 
constant barrage of such images, she asserts, can lead to psychological numbness, 
cynicism, or apathy, a feeling of helplessness resulting from a perceived inability to "fix" 
the problems. Seen in this light, then, it makes sense that media outlets and governments, 
who often rely on a population willing to spend money on entertainment, goods, and 
services, would have a vested interest in restricting images or reports that might lead to 
these types of emotions. America, perhaps more than almost any other nation, is better 
able to manage the flow of information to its citizens because of superior technology and 
great geographic distance from many world events. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the many ways that those in power manipulate images 
and reporting related to warfare and the dead in an effort to sanitize the information and 
maintain hegemonic control. Although virtually all of the examples were from 
America's history and present, these same ideas can easily be extended to other global 
powers through time. One of the key points of this chapter is that language is used in 
many ways to create truth and reality, so that what at first glance may seem reasonable is 
actually quite misleading or represents less than the whole story. Furthermore, this 
chapter has shown why America in particular, because of its unique geographic location, 
must experience warfare through the media, and therefore its citizens have at best an 
incomplete understanding of the atrocities of war and killing. Furthermore, this chapter 
has shown that people have a psychological need to remain at a distance from such 
images and realities; to live otherwise would invite mental overload and potential feelings 
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of overwhelming despair and helplessness that are perhaps opposed to the goals of 
consumerism and the state. 
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Chapter Three: The Wounded 
In war, there are no unwounded soldiers. 
-Jose Narosky 
Battlefield medical procedures and advances in protective gear have contributed 
significantly to the growing number of soldiers who are surviving injuries that even ten or 
twenty years ago likely would have killed them. This has resulted in a larger number 
than ever of soldiers who return from combat with severe wounds, such as extensive 
scarring and missing limbs. These veterans serve as a very visible reminder that war, at 
its heart, involves fighting, wounding, and killing. For whereas it may be easy to ignore 
flag-draped coffins returning from battlefields ( especially when footage of those coffins 
is banned), turning a proverbial blind eye to a wounded soldier is arguably more difficult. 
This chapter discusses these soldiers and what some of the implications of these new 
classes of wounds are. I argue that this new class of wounded veteran is problematic for 
the state, as its existence and visibility promote messages that are potentially harmful to 
the aims of the media, the military, and the government. Also, this chapter will touch 
briefly on some of the long-term consequences of these wounds on the already difficult 
task of social reintegration. Finally, I will discuss some of the unseen wounds, such as 
mental trauma and illnesses from toxic chemicals and munitions, that are becoming 
increasingly common among soldiers. 
Wounds Through Time 
The wounds of modem warfare, although potentially more horrific than those 
from previous conflicts, are perhaps less honorable than they once would have been. 
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Throughout much of history, wounds incurred in battle were a great mark of distinction. 
Wounds were a visible testament to a person's  manliness, valor, and courage. The 
number of wounds alone, however, was not enough to earn a soldier the respect of his 
countrymen. The placement of the wounds, whether on the front or the back, was equally 
if not more important to the quantity, as this indicated whether he had earned them while 
fighting or fleeing. Aelian (Varia Historia 12.21) recounts that Spartan mothers, for 
instance, would examine the bodies of their fallen sons, counting whether more wounds 
appeared on the front than on the back. If this was the case, they celebrated and could be 
proud of their children's sacrifice. But if not, they would depart in shame and grief, 
sometimes leaving the bodies to be buried in a common grave. Stories such as this that 
highlight the importance of wounds were common in ancient literature. Matthew Leigh 
(1995) catalogs examples from Homer (Iliad 8.93f., 13.288ff., 22.250ff.), Thucydides 
(5.10.9), Sallust (Bellum Catilinae 60.7, 61.4), Plutarch (Agesilaus 36.2), Xenophon 
(Agesilaus 6.2), and several others. According to Leigh (1995: 197), this motif occurs so 
frequently in ancient texts that its full enumeration would risk "a certain degree of over­
kill." 
Using wounds as a mark of distinction was not, however, limited to the ancient 
world. Brain ( 1979) discusses 19th century African customs of self-scarring, indicating 
the willingness of the bearer to incur the "real thing." He also notes that as late as the 
1800s men from many African cultures, and even high-ranking German politicians, 
would highlight existing scars with wine or ash to make them even more prominent. 
Self-scarring was so important, Brain argued, that in many parts of the world it had 
become a veritable rite of passage, a substitute for genuine battle scars in the absence of 
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real conflict. Whatever other doors in life prowess in battle might open, throughout 
history wounds and their silent, permanent testament to the manliness of the bearer have 
certainly flung wide the gates leading to the realm of politics. 
Traditionally, individuals with military experience have had easier access to 
public office. Matthew Leigh ( 1995) convincingly shows that in the ancient world, scars 
from the battlefield were almost prerequisites for those aspiring to political greatness, and 
their presence or absence was noted by the voters and political commentators of their 
day. In modem America, for instance, political leaders, and especially those at the 
federal level, regularly have some experience in the military. Although visible wounds 
are less common among soldiers in general, ribbons and medals continue to provide proof 
of courage and resolve. Many United States Presidents have distinguished military 
backgrounds, including Washington, Jackson, Grant, Teddy Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and 
George H. W. Bush. Other modem political leaders, such as Senators John McCain and 
John Kerry, attest to the air of authority that experience in battle affords. Often when a 
candidate for office has little or no military experience, voters and political opponents are 
quick to question why and often ask how the candidate feels he or she would be able to 
manage military affairs as a result. But many of these historical leaders mentioned above 
(with the notable exceptions of McCain and Kerry) came from a time when conflicts 
were still relatively face-to-face. 
World War I was perhaps the first large-scale use of long-range weaponry, 
specifically in the form of mustard gas, that could kill at a distance and with little human 
intervention. By World War II, reliance on artillery, air raids, and other types of attacks 
that were directed at groups instead of an individual became even more common. 
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Nevertheless, even through the Korean War, much of the combat still relied on infantry 
soldiers slogging it out with rifles and other small arms. Vietnam, with the heavier 
reliance on traps, mines, ambushes, snipers, and other less visible combat, marks a 
distinct turning point where warfare abandoned much of its reliance on the single soldier 
engaged in one-on-one combat. This shift forever changed wounds and their meaning, 
both to the soldier and the citizen. 
As I mentioned above, wounds were once marks of courage and virtue that proved 
that the bearer had stood his ground and met the enemy, literally, in mortal combat. 
Through time, however, the distance at which warfare occurred grew, due in large part to 
the development of weapons with greater range, such as the bow 18 and the gun. I suggest 
that psychologically, wounds from these weapons until relatively recently likely carried 
with them a sense of intimate combat. 19  As an example, bows, while affording the safety 
of some distance, still required the archer, in general, to see the enemy, even if that 
enemy was only a large group. Firearms were incredibly inaccurate until around the start 
of the 19th century when rifling was introduced. For another hundred years, however, 
soldiers continued to face off against one another in fairly close proximity as military 
tactics struggled to keep pace with advances in weaponry. Throughout much of the 
history of warfare, then, the wounded soldier could say, "Look at what my enemy did to 
me." I argue that as the nature of war changed, however, it is at least possible that 
wounds have become less something to be proud of and more something to be pitied. 
1 8  Although the bow is a very old weapon, it was not until the heavy use of the "English" (or "Welsh") 
longbow in the 1 3th century and later that permitted its use in large-scale organized war from especially 
great distances. 
19 Ehrenreich ( 1 997: 1 76- 1 78) sees this psychological shift as happening coincident with the invention of 
the bow and the gun. 
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Modem combat is almost never a face-to-face fight. Instead, low-intensity 
combat (LI C) is becoming the norm (I discuss LI Cs at greater length later in this chapter). 
In this style of fighting, the enemy is often obscured, or may not even be present, such as 
in the case of a remotely-detonated bomb. Snipers, hit-and-run attacks, suicide 
bombings, rocket and mortar barrages, and other similar tactics are the staples of 
engagement. In this type of warfare, wounded soldiers can no longer associate the same 
pride with their injuries. I suggest that now, the soldier must instead say, "Look at what 
war did to me." The wound is transformed from a badge of honor into an unfortunate 
accident attributed not to man-to-man combat, that primal struggle for survival, but rather 
to bad luck. The incident becomes more abstract and therefore less personal and 
meaningful. This could have an impact on the psychology and morale of soldiers who 
have returned from war bearing horrific wounds from an enemy unseen.20 
Wounded Soldiers and the State 
This new class of wounded soldier, in which the injuries are often more severe 
and are increasingly the result of indirect combat, is problematic to the state. Veterans 
who return from combat relatively unscathed can be used, in effect, as shining examples 
of duty and honor. They did their part and can now return to civilian life secure in the 
knowledge that they helped to spread "freedom" and "democracy" throughout the world. 
The state congratulates them and thanks them for their efforts. Likewise, dead soldiers 
also contribute to the goals of the state. Soldiers who have died can be revered as a noble 
2
° For a more in-depth discussion about the psychological impact of modern warfare on soldiers, see the 
section titled "The Invisible Wounds of War: Mental Trauma." 
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sacrifice for a higher purpose. With formal pomp and circumstance, they can be laid to 
rest in a sacred space, draped in a flag, with full honors and the "gratitude of a nation." 
Politicians and military leaders can invoke their names and accomplishments to rouse the 
spirits of the people and urge them on to action.2 1 
Wounded soldiers, on the other hand, exist in a liminal space between the heroic 
veteran and the martyred sacrifice, and as such are a more difficult problem for the state 
to address. As I have discussed throughout the thesis, the state often has vested interests 
in making warfare as sanitized and controlled as possible. These horrifying wounds, 
however, are a largely new and very potent visual statement that warfare is not as 
sanitized as those in power might have citizens believe. Women amputees are a perfect 
example of a new class of wounded that is problematic for the state. Judy Bellafaire, an 
expert in women's roles in war through time, says that female amputees from the War on 
Terror are a new phenomenon (St. George 2006). Conservatives are concerned that they 
will undermine public support for the war even further if they discuss wounded women, 
while liberals are cautious about broaching the topic for fear that they will jeopardize 
support for women in combat roles (St. George 2006). 
The concept of the "disappearing body" is certainly at work here, too, both 
literally and figuratively. In many cases, these veterans have had parts of their body 
2 1 Consider, for instance, President Bush's co-opting of the phrase "Let's roll" as a national call to action 
after 9/1 1 .  The words were the last spoken by Todd Beamer on United Flight 93 as he and other passengers 
attempted to regain control of the aircraft from the hijackers. Following 9/1 1 ,  "Let's roll" was heavily used 
by the media, advertisers, and government officials in patriotic messages. Although not a soldier per se, 
Todd's death made him, in effect, a martyr, one of the first to die in the new War on Terror, and he was 
held up by the state as an exemplar of all that is good about the American spirit. In fact, Todd's  wife Lisa 
became somewhat of a media staple after 9/1 1 ,  appearing as Bush addressed congress and the nation, and 
making frequent appearances on news shows. His death (his "sacrifice") had become a commodity of the 
state. 
76 
actually disappear, vanishing as a direct result of state military action. This is not 
disappearance in a symbolic sense, but rather a terribly real and absolutely violent reality. 
Their increasing presence may send rather opposing messages about what is required to 
further the aims of the state, that, for instance, not just a symbolic sacrifice is given for 
your nation but indeed a very real blood sacrifice from your own body. The problem for 
that state is that little if any positive spin can turn a wound into a "good thing"; each 
individual judges for himself what the wound means, such that it is by its nature an 
uncontrollable message. 
Indeed it is the message of these wounds that deserves closer attention. On the 
one hand, many veterans are now using their wounds as testaments to the brutal effects of 
war: they want to bring attention to their own and others' sacrifices. Some organizations, 
such as Veterans for Peace (veteransforpeace.org) and Iraq Veterans Against the War 
(ivaw.net), use wounds to reveal the true horrific cost of the war. Other groups, such as 
the Wounded Warrior Project (woundedwarriorproject.org), focus more on highlighting 
the sacrifices that wounded veterans have made and place much less emphasis on the 
negative aspects of the injuries. Lance Corporal Ryan Autery is a good example of a 
veteran who uses his wounds to send a message of sacrifice. He lost much of his left arm 
as a result of a roadside bomb in Iraq as part of the War on Terror. He had his prosthetic 
arm painted in Marine Corps camouflage with a Purple Heart badge attached (Ruane 
2005). 
In either case, whether wounded veterans use their injuries as statements on the 
brutality of war or whether they use them to bring attention to their noble sacrifices, their 
bodies become objects upon which the narratives of warfare are inscribed. This is an 
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example of how the body can become a writing surface upon which society inlays its 
norms, as Clastres (1974: 153) suggested. Clastres goes on to describe how society ( or in 
this case, the state) "prints its mark on the body of its youth" (1974:157), and wounds 
from war are certainly a very real mark imprinted as a result of state action. Critically, 
Clastres states that this mark "acts as an obstacle to forgetting," that, in many ways, the 
body becomes a living, breathing memory that prevents anyone from ignoring the reality 
it presents. He was writing these statements about rites of passage, and this makes his 
sentiments all the more appropriate, for as Ehrenreich ( 1997) painstakingly showed ( and 
as has been discussed earlier in this thesis), warfare has been and continues to be a very 
real rite of passage in modern society. 
Furthermore, the work of Foucault (1977) similarly argues that hegemonic 
institutions, such as the military and the penal system ( and, by extension, organized 
religion, education, etc.), imprint individuals with the norms and values of society. If we 
accept these observations, then it becomes clear that the state is saying, through these 
wounds, that the interests of the elite, of government, of the powerful, are more important 
than human life. The state is, in effect, saying that sacrifices such as these are an 
acceptable cost for maintaining control and furthering its goals. And this is precisely one 
of the most important reasons why wounded veterans are problematic for the state, 
because they are living canvases that display the effects of power in potentially very 
negative ways. These, however, are only the visible wounds. But modern warfare - and 
the social culture of war in general - has created a class of invisible wounds to which 
veterans and activists continue to struggle to bring attention. 
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Many of the injuries of war are external and highly visible, such as amputated 
limbs, bullet wounds, shrapnel scars, and so forth. Researchers, scholars, and even the 
veterans themselves are only now, however, calling attention to the less visible marks of 
conflict. Some of these invisible wounds include mental trauma, such as post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD), as well as an assortment of illnesses such as Gulf War Syndrome 
and those attributed to Agent Orange and depleted uranium. 
Culture and the Body 
It is important to understand the ways in which culture affects our understanding 
of the wounded, especially in cases where the trauma is not so visible. Over the last few 
decades, the field of medical anthropology has provided an excellent lens through which 
to view these issues. Within this field, researchers such as Margaret Lock ( e.g., 
Lindenbaum and Lock 1 993 ; 1 993a; 1 993b; 2002; Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1 987), 
Arthur Kleinman (e.g., 1 995; 1 99 1 ;  1 994), Allan Young (e.g., 1 980; 1 982; 1 993 ; 1 995), 
and Paul Farmer ( e.g., 1 990; 1 992; 1 999; 2003) have developed new paradigms for 
understanding psychological trauma and recovery. Their work has great significance 
here because, as I have shown, war is more and more frequently producing wounded 
soldiers with an increasing amount of emotional issues tied to their injuries. 
A common theme throughout the writings of these scholars is that social changes, 
rather than biological realities, have resulted in the increase of psychological and 
psychiatric diagnoses in W estem society that are attributed to mental trauma, especially 
during the last few decades. This assertion that social rather than biological causes have 
been a primary factor in the rise in diagnoses of mental trauma highlights the debate and 
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tension between medical anthropology and Western biomedicine. 22 What is most 
important, however, is that at the heart of their work lies the notion that an individual 
both suffers and recovers from illness and trauma in culturally specific ways. It is 
impossible, they assert, to separate the suffering individual from his or her environment, 
since culture contributes to both the suffering itself and the recovery process. This notion 
of a division ( or lack thereof) between the social body and the biological body is almost a 
century old and owes much to the work of anthropologists such as Rivers (e.g., 1916), 
Durkheim (e.g., 1961), and Mauss (e.g., 1979). 
Paul Farmer (1990; 1992; 1999; 2003), for example, suggests that HIV in Haiti 
and other places is understood only in conjunction with its expression in society and an 
awareness of the power differentials that contribute to the illness. Even though much of 
his work concentrates on HIV, his arguments can apply to almost any malady in virtually 
any society, as some of his own work shows (e.g., 2003). In addition, several other 
anthropologists have written comparative studies conclusively showing that identical 
biological processes are experienced in distinctly different ways across disparate cultures. 
These studies cover a diverse array of subjects, including childbirth (Jeffery and Jeffery 
1993), organ donation (Lock 2002), menopause (Lock 1993b ), female genital mutilation 
(James and Robertson 2002), and mental trauma (Young 1995). All of these studies 
reinforce the understanding that biological processes manifest in unique ways for each 
individual and are inexorably linked with social mores. 
22 The term "biomedicine" refers to the Western medical culture that subscribes to a disease-oriented 
model of illness and treatment. In other words, all "normal" doctor-patient interactions, hospitalizations, 
treatments, and so forth in industrialized Western nations fall under this term. 
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Using this logic, it is quite possible to suggest that an understanding of mental 
trauma among veterans that is associated with their injuries is impossible without taking 
into account the social world of the soldiers. For example, one must comprehend the 
developmental social networks of their childhoods, the power of the W estem biomedical 
community to codify diseases, and the socially acceptable paths of recovery Gust to name 
a few) before the complete picture of personal suffering emerges. 
Unfortunately, at least within the paradigm of Western medicine, many 
professionals do not recognize this as an important step. As such, those who seek 
treatment for injuries, whether physical or mental, are transformed from a victim into 
someone with a disease. Kleinman and Kleinman ( 1997) note that an individual's 
"memories of violation" become appropriated as "trauma stories," which become a type 
of currency or symbolic capital. The sufferer then exchanges this currency for goods and 
services, such as psychological assistance and disability payments. These images of 
trauma, the Kleinmans argue ( 1991; 1997), are appropriated by health professionals to 
turn social experience into a medical condition. This is the process that turns the victim 
into a patient: 
Indeed, to receive even modest public assistance it may be necessary to 
undergo a sequential transformation from one who experiences, who 
suffers political terror to one who is a victim of political violence to one 
who is sick, who has a disease. Because of the practical political and 
financial importance of such transformations, the violated themselves may 
want, and even seek out, the re-imaging of their condition so they can 
obtain the moral as well as the financial benefits of being ill. ( 1997: 10) 
They go on to wonder what such a process says about us as a society, and in what way 
does the appropriation of someone's suffering alter that traumatic experience? What does 
it mean, for instance, to transform the consequences of one's duty in the military, which 
8 1  
may involve killing and the witnessing of atrocities, into "guilt," "paranoia," or a "failure 
to cope"? 
In warfare, much of what soldiers do or witness is contrary to human experience. 
Killing, witnessing a great deal of violent death, handling corpses, mortal danger, and 
other hardships are not the everyday realities of most people, especially in developed 
Western societies. Nor do most people have the mental preparation to process and cope 
with such activities effectively (Young 1 995: 1 1 2). The soldiers can become victims of 
severe mental distress, unable to accept what they have seen. But those who do seek help 
can face an impersonal and even harmful reception. Lock ( 1 993a: 14 1 ), for instance, 
notes that "in institutional settings, individual distress is systematically transformed into 
the amoral, decontextualized signs and symptoms of biomedicine." In addition, 
pathologizing trauma assigns a type of blame for the condition, often on the sufferer 
himself, making the patient responsible for his or her own illness (see, e.g., Taussig 1 980; 
Young 1980; Young 1 990). This process can lead to the trivialization of the experiences 
and a delegitimazation of the suffering, which can make recovery more difficult 
(Kleinman 1 995, esp. ch. 5). Psychiatry and psychology stand virtually alone in creating 
these unfortunate outcomes in that, unlike any other subfield of biomedicine, they 
"medicalize" social behaviors. Indeed, these disciplines essentially become the final 
authority on what social behaviors are acceptable and normal (Fabrega Jr. 1 993). 
One of the primary reasons this is so prevalent in Western societies is that, as a 
culture, most modem industrialized peoples have handed over health to the medical 
profession and unquestioningly believe what they say. Foucault ( 1 965; 1 977) suggests 
that in the modem world bodies have become subject to increased control and regulation 
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in the name of health. When combined with abstract ways of describing pathologies 
using highly technical language ( a common technique of the powerful elite, as I have 
shown), which moves illness further out of the hands of normal society, a very potent 
means of control lies in the hands of the medical profession (Fabrega Jr. 1993: 168). 
Allan Young (1982), as Lock (1993a: 144-5) points out, was the first anthropologist to 
wonder why biomedicine seemingly is immune from "epistemological scrutiny" of the 
discourse that helps secure its position of great power in Western society. Indeed, one 
terrible result of this control is that using medicine or other clinical measures to treat 
what have historically been social conditions aborts any efforts ( or even the very need) to 
address the underlying social causes of the disorder (Fabrega Jr. 1993: 185). 
When viewed in this way, it makes sense that those in power would want to 
suppress anything that might uncover the links between society and trauma. To do so 
would require an admission that something in the culture contributes to the suffering that, 
for example, soldiers often endure after they return home with horrific wounds, both 
physical and psychological. Similarly, it would require an admission that warfare, and 
what actually happens during its execution (i.e., killing, gruesome combat, etc.), is 
contrary to basic human nature. It would be a statement that the goals of the state are 
more important than the well-being of its citizens. 
One of the best examples that illustrates the close connections between culture 
and suffering is mental trauma among veterans. Since the 1970s, significant attention has 
been given to the mental state of veterans. I suggest that now more than ever, a complete 
understanding of how culture contributes to the development of psychological trauma and 
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recovery is critical since the conditions of warfare, as I have discussed, are more severely 
affecting military personnel. 
The Invisible Wounds of War: Mental Trauma 
Upon return from Vietnam, many of the soldiers were so vilified by the American 
public that they quickly vanished back into society in an attempt to avoid criticism and 
anger. Here we witness another case of the disappearing body, driven this time not by the 
state so much as by the general population who turned their anger and frustration at the 
war against the very people who were fighting it (a large majority of whom had little 
choice but to go). Over time many veterans from Vietnam began experiencing similar 
symptoms, including suicidal tendencies, drug and alcohol abuse, hyperalertness, chronic 
pain, changes in sleep patterns, and an inability to readjust to society. In 1 980, a new 
mental disorder was built around these symptoms: post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 
PTSD quickly became a popular diagnosis for Vietnam veterans (Brende and Parson 
1985; Figley 1 985; Spiegel 2003), and even today it continues to be a central focus of 
those concerned with the mental health of veterans. 
Research has shown that the tactics employed in modem warfare contribute to an 
overall increase in cases of mental trauma among soldiers. For example, the work of 
August and Gianola ( 1 987) is especially illustrative regarding how features of modern 
conflicts can impact the psychological trauma of soldiers. The authors found that during 
the Vietnam War, the increased use of guerrilla tactics, the confused ideologies 
surrounding the conflict, and the unclear identification of the enemy all contributed to the 
especially severe psychological reactions among veterans. Guerrilla tactics, such as 
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improvised explosive devices (IEDs, popularly known as "roadside bombs"), smper 
attacks, hit-and-run attacks with mortars and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), close­
quarter ambushes, and similar tactics are common realities in modern conflicts that rarely 
feature large engagements or clearly defined battlegrounds. In fact, the U.S. Secretary of 
Veterans Affairs, Anthony J. Principi, noted that violent guerrilla tactics used in Iraq will 
have a considerable impact on the mental health of troops (Young 2004). Paul Rieckhoff, 
a platoon leader in Iraq and executive director of the Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of 
America, said this about the uncertainties of urban combat: "In the urban terrain, the 
enemy is everywhere, across the street, in that window, up that alley. It's a fishbowl. 
You never feel safe. You never relax" (Shane 2004). 
Unclear ideologies supporting wars are perhaps now more then ever before 
exceptionally common (see, e.g., Summerfield 2000; Timmins 2005). For instance, the 
War on Terror began as an attempt to bring to justice those responsible for the 9/11 
attacks against America, but quickly shifted to defeating the Taliban, crushing Al-Qaeda, 
rooting out and ending all terrorism regardless of origin, and establishing democracies in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. President Bush, as an example, in front of a massive banner stating 
"Mission Accomplished," declared an end to "major combat operations" in Iraq on May 
1, 2003, less than two months after the initial invasion, yet over 90 percent of military 
deaths in that country have happened since that declaration. This is an excellent example 
of the nebulous nature of contemporary warfare that was mentioned in the preceding 
chapter. Here is a state leader declaring an end to major combat operations when, in 
reality, deadly fighting rages on. Defining the start and end points for a modern conflict 
can be extremely difficult, as the lines between war and peace regularly blur and intersect 
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(see, e.g., Nordstrom 1997; Nordstrom 2004). Finally, difficult identification of the 
enemy is a continuing problem, especially in conflicts with ill-defined borders and non­
state actors as the primary enemy combatants. As already discussed, guerrilla tactics 
often obscure the enemy, and in fact, the enemy frequently blends in to crowds, or can be 
anyone from a disparate number of countries. The ranks of terrorist organizations such as 
Al-Qaeda span the globe and consist of members based not on nationality but rather on 
beliefs. The result is an enemy whose face can be constantly shifting and changing. 
I briefly mentioned the term "low-intensity conflict" earlier in this chapter, and 
now I return to it in the context of mental trauma. Coined in the late 1970s, the term 
describes a new way of waging larger wars, largely based on the tactics faced in Vietnam. 
The United States Army (1990) defines LIC thus: 
Low intensity conflict is a political-military confrontation between 
contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, 
peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted 
struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict 
ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a 
combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and 
military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally 
in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications. 
This concept can encompass guerrilla tactics, small firefights, or even violence that is 
disturbingly "low tech." LIC is very representative of many conflicts in the world today. 
Kleinman and Kleinman (1997: 10) write that in LI Cs, people are not killed; instead, they 
are "hacked into pieces, blown up, torn apart, burned and broken." A key component of 
LI Cs is that the enemy is not generally part of a standing army, but rather consists of 
insurgents, rebels, or soldiers cobbled together from disparate sources. This further 
contributes to the uncertainty of exactly who is the enemy. Some researchers (e.g., 
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Dheer, et al. 2003; Young 2004) have shifted attention onto this type of warfare recently, 
and they have found that low intensity conflicts have serious negative psychological 
effects on soldiers, including PTSD. 
Perhaps one of the key components that has allowed veterans to disappear into 
society upon return is a shift in the culture of warfare - or, more specifically, the culture 
of the warrior - in many states. Historically, many cultures believed that the warrior was 
worthy of great respect, and as such, the public often participated in ceremonies that 
transformed a citizen into a soldier before battle and then back into a citizen after battle 
as well (Ehrenreich 1997: 10-12). The shift away from such "welcoming" or 
"reintegration" ceremonies could be contributing to the declining mental health of 
veterans, especially those who experience significant trauma while deployed (see, e.g., 
Mogapi 2003). In America, for instance, even as recently as the end of World War II, 
soldiers were welcomed home, for the most part, as heroes. 23 But, during Korea ( the so­
called "Forgotten War"), and, as mentioned before, certainly during Vietnam, soldiers 
regularly received no welcome at all or, worse, were met with anger. Research has 
shown that supportive ceremonies can help to ease the transition back into society for 
returning soldiers. 
For example, Native Americans who fought in Vietnam, particularly those who 
maintained a strong affiliation with their tribes, were less likely to suffer debilitating 
mental disorders such as PTSD than most other groups (Brende and Parson 1985). 
Although many factors contribute to this, one reason the authors cite is that many Native 
23 This was a double-edged sword, however, as many WWII veterans felt compelled to maintain the image 
of the brave soldier-hero, at least outwardly. Several likely suffered from mental trauma but never sought 
help, fearing it would make them appear weak. 
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Americans still regard warfare and the role of the warrior as an initiation and something 
that is respected. Also, upon return, many Native Americans were included in cleansing 
ceremonies welcoming them back into the tribe and their former social roles. Similarly, 
Harper (1990: 102-111) discusses cultural and ethnic variability among groups, including 
African-Americans, Hispanics, Puerto Ricans, and Asian-Americans, and their reactions 
to the mental stress of combat during Vietnam. The lack of public recognition of 
returning veterans in general, as well as the shift towards viewing the role of the soldier­
warrior as not quite as extraordinary and worthy of respect as perhaps it once was, are 
two of the results of a social attitude shift towards war in many societies. Such a shift, as 
research has shown, could be contributing significantly to the decline in veterans' mental 
health. 
Despite all the attention given to PTSD in the professional literature and by 
medial practitioners, some scholars argue (see, e.g., Kleinman 1995; Kleinman and 
Kleinman 1997; Young 1990; Young 1993; Young 1995) that it is not a valid mental 
disorder at all. Rather, they suggest that what we label PTSD is in fact an expression of 
mental trauma as a function of social and cultural norms unique to each sufferer. One of 
the primary differences between the views of anthropology and biomedicine is that 
whereas anthropologists tend to argue that PTSD is strongly linked with social factors, 
biomedical professionals emphasize the timeless biological qualities of the disorder 
(Young 1995:3). Medical professionals have argued that evidence for PTSD exists in 
works of literature, such as Shakespeare's  plays and even as far back as the Epic of 
Gilgamesh (Boehnlein and Kinzie 1992; Trimble 1985). Young, however, believes 
(1995 :3-5) that this is an example of reading into the past something that is a recent social 
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construct. He states that the modem conceptions of PTSD and traumatic memory did not 
exist during those times and therefore could not appear in those texts. 
Another disagreement, as Arthur Kleinman (1995: 180) notes, 1s that the 
diagnostic criteria for PTSD emphasize the long-term persistence of symptoms, which 
make it pathological. The problem with this, he argues, is that this implies that a 
"normal" response to trauma is not characterized by a "continuation of complaints." He 
writes that according to the DSM, any depressive episode, such as bereavement, 
sleeplessness, etc., can be classified as severe if it continues for more than two months. 
The central message from the DSM seems to be that suffering is not to be endured. To 
him, this is a problem, since in many parts of the world (including for many people in 
America), mourning and other personal and social suffering regularly continue for 
upwards of a year or more. Furthermore, he points out that the American ethic of 
"getting over" problems by returning to work or starting a new relationship is contrary to 
most of the world's ideas of recovery. 
Young (1 995: 124-8) also takes issue with the diagnostic criteria of PTSD. 
Specifically, he notes two problems. First, the criteria say that a traumatic event must be 
"markedly distressing to almost anyone" (American Psychiatric Association 1987:250). 
Many events that one person may consider severely traumatic, Young argues, may not be 
particularly distressing to "almost anyone." In fact, he writes, clinicians routinely ignore 
this criterion if the event clearly distressed the individual patient and, in their opinion, 
would distress at least a good number of people. In addition, the DSM does not clarify a 
time in which the patient becomes distressed; that is, most earlier research on traumatic 
memory (e.g.,  Kardiner 1941) indicated that the distress was closely linked with the 
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actual temporal experience of the event. Yet now, medical professionals believe that at 
the time, a given event may not be particularly traumatic, but moving forward a person 
may experience guilt or other emotions that cause the event to become traumatic. 
Without a defined temporal aspect, the usefulness of the diagnostic criteria becomes 
weakened. 
The second issue, according to Young, is that a traumatic event must be "outside 
the range of usual human experience" (American Psychiatric Association 1987:250). The 
use of "usual" is problematic. Although it may be easy to define a list of events 'that are 
universally traumatic and clearly not everyday human experience, such as the killing of a 
close friend or the sudden death of a loved one, creating a list applicable only to most 
people is terrifically difficult. Concepts of what is and is not traumatic vary widely 
among cultures. Beyond this, however, what is considered a traumatic event can even 
change among groups that otherwise share a culture. For example, Young (1995:127-
128) says that one group of soldiers may find extreme torture repugnant, but another 
group may use it frequently. The fluidness of what can and cannot be considered 
traumatic or "usual" makes the inclusion of this as a diagnostic criterion a valid point of 
contention. In reality, many anthropologists would argue, the DSM criteria for PTSD are 
ethnocentric and biased towards Western society, which calls into question the 
universality of the condition. 
Citing the work of Connerton ( 1989), Kleinman suggests that key traumatic 
memories are not to be erased but rather commemorated, as commemoration of trauma 
can aid in the recovery process. PTSD, he argues, has become "medicalized" as a 
psychiatric condition instead of what has historically been handled at the religious or 
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social level (1995:181; see also above). Kleinman convincingly argues that the DSM and 
its pathologizing of PTSD have the power to shape reality, to create a form of being that, 
as he quotes from Foucault, "can and must be thought" (1985; see also Deleuze 1988). 
This pathologizing of PTSD and other psychological disorders as a disease is necessitated 
by certain parties such as insurance companies, who will pay for treatment of a disease 
but will not assist in recovery from distress. There is, as he and others suggest, a political 
economy to be found in the disease model (1995:181-2; see also Kirk and Kutchins 
1992). 
This section has briefly touched on some of the psychological problems that 
soldiers face as part of modem warfare, both on and off the battlefield. Also, and perhaps 
most important, it has shown that culture is a crucial component of suffering. Before we 
can understand and address many of the issues veterans face as a result of their wounds, 
whether physical or mental, we must comprehend the ways in which culture and society 
contribute to their suffering and recovery. Such trauma constitutes a large part of the 
"invisible wounds" of war, and a great number of those who suffer are soldiers who have 
"disappeared" into society. Mental trauma, however, is not the only invisible problem 
that many veterans have faced, as the next section will discuss. 
Invisible Wounds of War: Syndromes and Disease 
In addition to mental trauma, soldiers face the potential for physical health 
problems as well, many of which are difficult to isolate. Perhaps the best example of this 
has happened in America over the past twenty-five years or so. During that time, 
veterans began returning from war with new illnesses whose origins and outcomes are 
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not well-understood, such as ailments related to Agent Orange exposure in Vietnam and 
Gulf War Syndrome. These illnesses have, in many cases, resulted in a standoff that pits 
veterans against the government in a showdown of opposing ideologies. Veterans have 
had to fight, for instance, for recognition of their condition as a legitimate illness, which 
is something the U.S. government has often been less than willing to do. In addition, 
however, these "invisible" wounds are used not just by American veterans and activists to 
attest to the horrors of war or to demand remuneration, but also by "enemy" forces as 
proof of their victimization and as evidence of America's "war crimes" or "genocidal" 
policies. 
In the previous chapter, I discussed how the health risks associated with Agent 
Orange exposure during and since the Vietnam War exemplify one aspect of the 
disappearing body. Specifically, I looked at how the popular media tend to cover a war 
based on what they feel are clearly-drawn boundaries neatly enclosing a particular 
conflict (which, in the case of Vietnam, would be 1 962-72). But, as many authors have 
pointed out (such as Nordstrom 1 997; Nordstrom 2004), wars tend to have nebulous 
boundaries. The lack of coverage after a conflict "ends" can prevent many stories of 
those wounded or killed as a result of its lingering effects from ever coming to light, or at 
least coming to light relatively late. These "lingering effects" include, for example, land 
mines, which continue to claim innocent lives even today at an astonishing rate (Strada 
1 996). I would like to return now, however, to the discussion of the effects brought on, at 
least allegedly in some cases, by chemicals that have been used in munitions, including 
Agent Orange and depleted uranium. The debates surging around these issues for almost 
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thirty years now have often been contentious, both in America and in several countries 
where the United States has operated. 
What is interesting is that the government expended considerable effort in the 
forms of litigation, committees, and research to fight the accusations that exposure to 
Agent Orange contributed to the illnesses, cancers, and deaths of numerous veterans. 
This is yet another example of the hegemonic system of power attempting to downplay 
the negative consequences of its decisions by silencing the accounts of those who 
suffered as a result. The U.S. government has shown by its history of litigation and 
payments related to Agent Orange that it cannot be trusted to be forthright about health 
effects on soldiers. America has a history of using soldiers as experimental guinea pigs. 
Recall, for example, that in the last chapter, I discussed many instances where the U.S. 
military conducted experiments on not only soldiers, but also the public, which were kept 
silent for decades (Gallagher 1993; Rosenberg 1980; Welsome 2000). But this is not just 
about making several sick veterans disappear without fair compensation. Had the 
government admitted wrongdoing, it could have opened itself up for attack from those in 
the international community who have regularly accused America of using illegal 
chemical weapons in what some have claimed is genocidal warfare. Whether this is the 
case or not, America has a long history of remaining silent in the face of obvious 
genocide in many parts of the world, including Cambodia, Iraq, Bosnia, Rwanda, 
Srebrenica, and Kosovo, as Samantha Power (2002) painstakingly shows in the Pulitzer 
Prize-winning A Problem From Hell. 
As an example of the international community accusing the United States of 
genocide, many Vietnamese have claimed that they continue to suffer the consequences 
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of America's failed war in their country. Studies, after all, show an essentially irrefutable 
correlation between Agent Orange (and, therefore, dioxin) exposure and poisoned soil, 
contaminated water and food supplies, cancers, and a higher rate of birth defects ( see, 
e.g., Fawthrop 2004; Ngo, et al. 2006; Schecter, et al. 2001; Stellman, et al. 2003). If the 
American state is responsible for similar illnesses in its own veterans, then why should it 
not be responsible for those in Vietnam? For one, America has a vested interest, as I 
have discussed, in expanding capitalism and opening up global markets, and this includes 
markets in Vietnam. As relations with Vietnam thawed out following the war, political 
leaders on both sides worked hard to put memories of the conflict behind them. 
Normalization of relations between the two nations was formalized in 1995. Therefore, 
those in power on both sides of the Pacific have a clear interest in silencing those who 
would dredge up unpleasant memories, even if they are still very much a part of the 
present. 
Another "invisible wound" of modem warfare is the increase in illness that is 
often attributed to the use of depleted uranium (DU) munitions.24 Initially used during 
the First Gulf War, DU is prized for its ability to pierce armor due to its incredible 
density, making it a lethal weapon against tanks and other heavily-reinforced vehicles 
and structures. The Pentagon asserts that in the First Gulf War, at least 860,000 DU 
rounds were fired, for a total weight of about 320 tons (Peterson 1999:3). The problem, 
24 Natural uranium contains the isotopes U234, U235, and U238• Enriched uranium is made up of only the 
extracted U234 and U235 isotopes, which are the most fissionable and most radioactive isotopes of the three. 
What remains is "depleted" uranium, which contains 99 .8% U238 and trace amounts of U23 ; it is 40% less 
radioactive than natural uranium. When munitions made of depleted uranium strike a target, they vaporize 
into a fine radioactive and toxic dust. The toxicity of the dust is a primary concern: it is easily breathable 
and ingestible, can enter the body as shrapnel or through other wounds, and, most important, it is readily 
blown about by the wind. 
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of course, is that uranium is radioactive, and like any radioactive material, it will decay, 
releasing radiation and toxins as it does so. The dust left over from these munitions 
remains contaminated for about 4.5 billion years ( or about the age of our solar system).25 
Many groups, including veterans, have argued that exposure to DU is a leading 
cause of Gulf War Syndrome, which I will discuss below. Whether this is the case or not, 
some research supports that DU exposure is at least linked with negative health 
consequences (see, e.g., McDiarmid, et al. 2000; McDiarmid, et al. 2001; Squibb and 
McDiarmid 2006). In Iraq, medical authorities have alleged that Iraqi war veterans have 
a 60 percent higher rate of cancers linked with radiation than civilians, that cases of 
leukemia have jumped 15-fold, that cancer rates in Basra's children have more than 
doubled since the war, and that the chance of miscarriage for Iraqi mothers is 3.2 times 
greater if the father of the baby served in the war (Peterson 1999:5). The medical 
evidence is compelling enough to Doug Rokke, a noted anti-DU activist, to say that DU 
"is the Agent Orange of the 1990s" (Peterson 1999:3). Yet multiple exposures to 
chemicals, toxins, and other agents during the First Gulf War make it nearly impossible 
to attribute all these ailments specifically to DU. 
Unlike exposure to Agent Orange, however, the elusive Gulf War Syndrome 
(GWS) has yet to even be acknowledged by those in power, at least officially. Because 
so little is known about GWS, I will not dwell too long on it here. But, essentially, the 
syndrome manifests itself as a group of symptoms that includes headache, fatigue, rashes, 
joint pain, respiratory problems, and other neuropsychological problems (Barrett, et al. 
25 
Although 4.5 bi llion years is admittedly a long time, the silver lining, if there is one, is that DU does 
indeed decay relatively slowly. The health and environmental impacts would be much worse if the half-life 
were significantly shorter, therefore making the radioactivity much higher. 
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2002). The U.S. government insists that no single syndrome could account for such a 
constellation of symptoms (Defense Science Board 1994; NIH Technology Assessment 
Workshop Panel 1994; Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses 
1996). Despite this, several studies have shown that Gulf War veterans do suffer similar 
medical complaints and that these complaints occur more frequently in Gulf War veterans 
than in other veteran populations (see, e.g., Fukuda, et al. 1998; Haley, et al. 1997; 
Labbate, et al. 1998; Steele 2000). Veterans and researchers who support the existence of 
GWS have put forward numerous theories to account for it, including chemical exposure, 
experimental vaccines, stress, and even depleted uranium (Jamal 1998). The bottom line, 
however, is that this is another case where veterans and activists are fighting the state for 
recognition of what they believe is a valid medical condition brought about through 
exposure to some harmful agent. Once again, those in power have a strong interest in 
disproving the links between military service and GWS to further the state's goals (in this 
case, the protection of Kuwaiti "freedom" and "democracy" and, likely, access to 
resources, namely oil). 
The previous two sections have delved into the subaltern world of war's "invisible 
wounds," focusing on mental trauma, Gulf War Syndrome, and the health risks 
associated with Agent Orange and depleted uranium. Each represents a chapter that the 
United States - or any nation-state - would like ripped from the pages of the chronicles 
of its military operations. Many are problematic in that they impact not just American 
veterans, but foreign soldiers and, most important, civilians. Whatever else is unclear 
about these ailments, one thing is crystal clear: the debates and struggles among veterans, 
activists, and the government will continue to rage on for the foreseeable future. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that wounds, which once were a relatively simple matter, 
are now anything but. Throughout history, wounds were largely a mark of distinction, to 
be displayed with pride as a testament to one's courage and service to one's state. 
Wounds, and the military service that resulted in them, opened doors into public service 
that otherwise may have remained closed. This was also a time when wounds, in 
essentially every case, were the result of mortal combat with one's enemy. Recently, 
however, this situation has changed. 
Throughout the 20th century, wounds ran an increasing likelihood of resulting 
from long-distance weaponry, transforming the wound from something personal into 
something more abstract, more the result of plain bad luck. This caused, I suggest, a 
fundamental shift in looking at wounds not so much as what the enemy did as what war 
itself did. Wounds, therefore, could be thought of less as valorous marks of battle, that 
glorious initiation rite into the ancient brotherhood of the warrior, and more as a pitiable 
handicap. 
Wounded veterans are problematic to the state precisely because they can no 
longer, at least as a group, be held up as paragons of virtue. The dead are afforded 
military honors, buried and memorialized as martyrs for a higher cause. The unscathed 
gave their service to something greater and have earned the respect of a nation. But 
wounded soldiers simply are living, breathing reminders that warfare is not neat and tidy, 
and that their appearance: and disability is the price, the willing price, that states pay to 
further their goals. 
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This chapter concluded with a look at some of the most senous "invisible 
wounds" of war. Such wounds represent the struggle between states (primarily, in this 
, case, the United States), activists, and veterans. In its efforts to suppress coverage of, 
deny responsibility for, and generally distance itself from these issues, the American state 
has contributed to the very literal disappearance of soldiers, as well as of foreign 
combatants and civilians, who have been caught up in the lethal remnants of global 
politics and conflict. 
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Conclusion 
Will all great Neptune 's ocean wash this blood I Clean from my hand? 
-William Shakespeare (Macbeth, act IL scene II: 58-59) 
Most people are familiar, at least in some fashion, with dystopian works of 
literature that appeared throughout the first half of the 20th century. Some of the best­
known examples include Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, Yevgeny Zamyatin' s  We, 
Ayn Rand's Anthem, Ray Bradbury's  Fahrenheit 451, and, of course, George Orwell 's  
1 984. All share common themes, such as the presence of a hegemonic dictatorship that 
rules the state and a central character fighting against it ( who, incidentally, often fails in 
this endeavor). But, and perhaps most important, one of the primary tools these ruling 
elite use to maintain their dominance is a control over information. Each author had a 
deep awareness that the ruling elite could manage the flow of information to the public 
and, through this, maintain a firm grip on the rod of power. 
In the modem world, leaders of the most powerful nation-states actively put into 
practice what was presaged in fiction. Using the United States as a primary example, this 
thesis has shown, specifically, how and why such states censor, restrict, alter, and 
otherwise control information related to the human cost of war. They do this because 
warfare, in many circumstances, is a positive force for the state in several ways, both 
abstract and tangible. Warfare continues to be a rite of initiation, not only for citizen­
soldiers, but also for political leaders and even for the state itself. Conflict can help to 
unite and reinvent a nation, providing something behind which all citizens, regardless of 
whatever else may be wrong in their lives, can rally behind. 
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Additionally, warfare provides real benefits in the form of economic growth and 
expansion. War often necessitates increased production and goods and services both here 
and on the front lines, opening up numerous opportunities for supply contracts, 
infrastructure repair, new construction, and so on. And long after the fighting has 
stopped, the wealthy and powerful hope that new markets have been created in which to 
sell goods and services over the long-term. In fact, warfare is so critical and lucrative to 
the state that it has become a religion unto itself, worshipped by the ruling elite and the 
power-hungry. 
Because warfare can unite a country, at least temporarily, many leaders do indeed 
preach a doctrine of common interests during times of conflict. In America, for instance, 
phrases such as "national interest," "national security," and "national defense" are thrown 
around 
as if all of these concepts applied equally to all of us, colored or white, 
rich or poor, as if General Motors and Halliburton have the same interests 
as the rest of us, as if [the President] has the same interest as the young 
man or woman he sends to war. (Zinn 2006) 
When leaders claim to be defending "the American way of life," exactly what kind of life 
is that? Who is best representative of a homogeneous American lifestyle when this 
nation is instead composed of a kaleidoscope of cultures? But therein lies the advantage 
of distracting citizens with an agenda of war: they lose sight of all the troubles on the 
homefront, all the class differences, the poverty, the health care problems, and so forth. 
While war rages, it always takes precedence over internal social concerns, meaning that 
those who suffer are the marginalized populations who often have little in common with 
their leaders. Noam Chomsky (2002:3 1 -32) argues that such populations have no way to 
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organize or to make their views known; in fact, many do not even know that others share 
their feelings that, for instance, social programs should take precedence over military 
spending. What is perhaps most interesting and, in many ways, tragic about this is that as 
several scholars have shown (e.g. , Abell 1992; Anderson 1982; Lutz 2001; Marullo 
1992), money directed towards the private sector and away from military budgets would 
actually result in a stronger economy. 
In this struggle to maintain hegemonic control, the media take center stage. They 
are a primary means by which the state controls who can know what, and when they may 
know it. The links between the state and media are strong indeed, as both share common 
interests. In an obvious sense, the media need those in power to provide stories, 
interviews, and other content, without which they would atrophy and die. The flow of 
power coursing through a state is likewise the lifeblood of the media. Censorship, often 
voluntary rather than imposed, is regularly used to restrict certain information that might 
cast a negative light on those in power, such as the true cost of fighting wars. In many 
cases, modern journalism has been reduced to the 30-second sound bite that maintains the 
status quo and keeps calm the waters on which the ship of state steams ahead. 
Also, media outlets are themselves often large corporations and are reliant on a 
strong economy and satisfied shareholders. In many ways, these are the same goals as 
most nation-states, which function best with a content population of willing consumers 
(Chomsky 2002; Herman and Chomsky 1988). And just as any business does, the media 
supply a product, which is to kee:p the public entertained and distracted while putting on 
the thinnest fa9ade of honesty, integrity, and transparency. For average consumers of 
Western media, life is too busy to take the time to scrutinize the validity of a given story, 
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and as such they rarely look for a second opinion. This is a world of reality television, 
blockbuster movies, and celebrity scandals, all of which keep people distracted from 
more serious issues impacting their hometown, their state, their nation, or the globe. 
And yet, most consumers of the media willingly buy a product that isolates them 
from the worst of what happens in the world. In America especially, because of its 
unique geographic situation and its relatively peaceful domestic history, citizens are more 
apt to forget the horrors of the past. In fact, seeing images or reading stories about the 
horrors of global conflict often make people happy that they do not need to live in a 
country where such things happen. Despite this relief, the awful truth is that awful things 
do happen in America, yet they happen to the marginalized groups who lack effective 
voices. As such, their stories are often silenced, and in this world, unless a story makes 
the front page or the top of a broadcast, it never happened. 
Because of this, it is relatively easy for those in power, especially in the United 
States, to manipulate or restrict information about the brutality of war. Although this is 
the case for numerous reasons, one key feature of the U.S. that allows this to happen is 
the perception of free speech and a free (and unbiased) press, at least among the majority 
of the masses (Chomsky 2002; Herman and Chomsky 1988). When the perception is that 
anyone can speak his or her mind, state-sponsored propaganda becomes largely 
unnecessary. Yet propaganda happens. Using carefully selected language, language that 
makes bodies irrelevant or nonexistent, military and political leaders can create a new 
reality where war is cleaner and more sanitized. In this war, citizens do not die, enemy 
soldiers are inhuman, and U.S. military dead never return home in flag-draped coffins. In 
this war, women, children, and the elderly are not discussed even though they constitute 
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90 percent of casualties. In this war, the media blame any noncombatant casualties on 
the enemy itself, essentially pointing a finger and shouting, "He started it." In such a 
world, it becomes easier to forget that America tested radioactive substances on its own 
citizens and soldiers (Gallagher 1993; Gusterson 2004; Rosenberg 1980), or that the U.S. 
military punished Japanese media outlets and professionals who spoke out against 
America's use of nuclear weapons (Braw 1986; Hook 1988). 
The seeming need for the media and political leaders to place definitive 
boundaries on warfare contributes to this loss of the human element of war. In truth, the 
lines separating war and peace are nonexistent, or at the very best, exceptionally porous; 
indeed they coexist in a continuum resembling a mobius strip, without beginning or end. 
Especially in modern warfare, then, the stories of those affected by war long after the 
shooting has ceased often disappear. The terrible legacies of Agent Orange, land mines, 
and toxic munitions are swept under the rug of history and are relegated instead to the 
realm of academia, rarely to escape into the larger collective consciousness. When wars 
have distinct endpoints, it is easy not to see the hundreds of thousands of deaths due to 
sanctions, decimated infrastructure, and poor or inadequate medical care. 
Even within America itself, however, the realities of war are often invisible. 
Wounded veterans are not afforded the same level of respect they once were, and in some 
cases are even ridiculed and despised for their role in warfare, and so it is easier for some 
of them, at least, to disappear into society. Their presence is problematic for the state, in 
that they can be neither valiant fallen heroes nor selfless citizens who contributed to the 
larger good of the state. Those suffering from the lingering effects of conflicts long since 
"over," such as veterans living with negative health consequences from Agent Orange, 
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are often invisible and have had great difficulties attaining official recognition for their 
injuries. To do so would involve an admission of guilt from the government, the military, 
or major industrial corporations, which is something any of those groups would prefer to 
avoid. 
In the end, then, the concept of the "disappearing body" in military and other 
contexts is one example of how hegemonic power structures attempt to maintain control 
of the hearts and minds of regular citizens. In this way, representations of the true human 
cost of conflict can be minimized. Truthfully, however, those who die and suffer without 
voices are not merely representative of the cost of war. Since war is a valuable tool for 
the state, they ultimately become representative of the results of state expansion, 
economic policies, and goals in an increasingly commodified world. Their lives become 
objectified, ready for use by the state when and if they are useful, and just as quickly 
pushed aside into the dark unseen comers of society when their existence serves no end 
or becomes problematic. The body of the wounded soldier or of the dead citizen is 
merely a canvas, as Clastres ( 197 4) and Foucault ( 1977) argue, upon which the powerful 
proclaim their willingness to sacrifice the individual for the aims of the state that, in 
reality, are of little use to any outside the elite class of leaders. It is in this inner sanctum 
of power that the interests of government, business, and the media converge, all wearing 
the same garments of authority, all equal, and all indistinguishable. 
Closing Remarks 
With this thesis, I have shown that the disappearing body within the context of 
war and violence is a specific example of the power of the nation-state exercised in an 
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effort to maintain its hegemonic control over the vast majority of the population. 
Although several scholars have touched on several aspects of this argument, none has 
brought together the disparate literatures on power, language and discourse, medical 
anthropology, the anthropology of the body, wounding and trauma, warfare, and the 
media in such a concentrated effort to explore this issue. One key addition that this work 
makes is that it uses examples from the current War on Terror to show a continuation of 
several of the concepts that other scholars have written on. For instance, I discuss 
contemporary examples of resistance, such as Cindy Sheehan, that are illustrative of 
Scott's ( 1990) notions of violating accepted public transcripts. In addition, I show that 
the language used to describe the War on Terror is illustrative of the notion that leaders 
must resort to describing conflict in abstract, idealistic terms in order to prevent too much 
analysis by the public (Chomsky 2002; Ehrenreich 1997; Fairclough 1989; Herman and 
Chomsky 1988). Finally, I believe that my discussion of how the wounds that result from 
the modem tactics of warfare situate within the historical contexts of wounds in general 
and of the state is perhaps my most unique contribution. By no means did I exhaust this 
topic, but I believe that the notion that wounds today pose unique problems for both 
veterans and the state is valid and worthy of further scholarship. 
In closing, I suggest that more than anything, this thesis has shown that warfare is 
an entrenched ritual of great significance and benefit to many nation-states, a major 
consequence of which is that vast numbers of people and their stories are marginalized, 
silenced, and forgotten. No longer is it generally possible to assign a simple reason for 
going to war, such as "That country clearly invaded us for the express purpose of taking 
our land and overthrowing our government." An examination of warfare through time 
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leads to the understanding that in the modem world war is its own justification. All of 
the apparent benefits of conflict, such as its perceived positive economic impacts, its 
ability to forge leaders, its role as a rite of passage, and its ability to unite citizens behind 
a common goal, are even more important to the powerful and elite leadership when 
expanded to the size and scope of modem nation-states. Also, however, war keeps the 
people distracted and prevents them from focusing on domestic issues such as poverty, 
hunger, poor health care, poor education, inequitable distribution of wealth, and the vast 
social problems among ethnicities. By creating an "enemy," nations can build up a 
proverbial straw man and bum him down with the fires of conflict. Simply too much is at 
stake not to have war. 
As such, we can now understand why, exactly, our leadership is willing to send 
young men and women to their deaths for causes that are not particularly clear. For a 
revelation of the true underlying reasons for going to war, whether to secure access to 
resources, to make vast sums of money, or even to open up new markets and install 
capitalist-friendly leadership to allow for further economic expansion, would invite 
criticism or hesitation on the part of many citizens. When seen in this way, it is strikingly 
clear why state leaders obfuscate their intentions and hide behind bankrupt justifications 
such as "freedom" and "democracy." 
In addition, an understanding of these ideas provides insight into the stories of the 
marginalized, the women, the children, the elderly, the noncombatant civilian, the 
disenfranchised veteran, and any other victim of war whose story all too often simply 
disappears. This disappearance allows for the perpetuation of war by making it appear 
more sanitized and less deadly than it actually is. And making war sanitary is a prime 
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goal of modern Western nation-states, as again, doing so helps to prevent protests and 
questions such as whether the ends should ever justify the means when human lives are at 
stake. 
Finally, it is imperative to remember that in many cases, and certainly in most 
Western nations, state leadership is elected, meaning that the people grant authority to 
those in power to act as their proxies in these most serious matters. What is startlingly 
evident, however, is that the interests our leaders represent are all too often not those of 
the common citizen. Instead, though they may pay extensive lip service to their 
constituents, in truth many leaders have their own agenda that they pursue, one that is far 
removed from the everyday reality of most people. We should therefore not be afraid to 
question the public transcript that governs our interactions with our leadership, however 
comfortable and familiar that mask may have become. 
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